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The Duke Model
A PERFORMANCE-BASED SOLUTION FOR
COMPENSATING COLLEGE ATHLETES
David A. Grenardo†
INTRODUCTION
“A man reaps what he sows,”1 or at least he should. The
limit that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n2 placed on
the damages college athletes can receive unfairly prevents college
athletes from earning compensation that is commensurate with
their valuable efforts.3 The Ninth Circuit’s holding warrants a
conversation between the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), its member institutions, and college athletes to address
the inequities flowing from a situation in which the multibillion
dollar business of college athletics continues to thrive and grow
while those creating the product—college athletes—remain
undercompensated and exploited.4
† Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law; Rice University, B.A.,
Duke University School of Law, J.D. The author would like to thank sports law professor
and scholar Peter Carfagna, Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School, and sports law
professor Anthony Baldwin, Professor of Law at Mercer University, who specializes in
labor law, for providing invaluable insight and comments on an earlier draft. The author
also thanks the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference for allowing the
author to present this article as a part of its New Scholars Panel on Corporate and
Employment Law. This article would not have been possible without the work of the
author’s current and former research assistants, Cali Franks, Rene Burnias, Lourdes
Vela, and Martha Salas, St. Mary’s University School of Law J.D. Candidates, and Blake
Pierce, Catherine Cook, Tyler Wilson, Trevor Gallaway, Molly Hunt, Stephanie Galy,
J.D. Vela, and Allison Moore, St. Mary’s University School of Law J.D.
1 Galatians 6:7.
2 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
3 Id. at 1052–53, 1079.
4 SeeWilliam B. Gould IV et al., Full Court Press: Northwestern University, A
New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2014) (discussing the
multibillion dollar industry of men’s college basketball and football); see alsoNCAA,DIVISION
1 MANUAL § 12.1.2 (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/
D118.pdf [https://perma.cc/L98F-56P9] [hereinafter DIVISION 1 MANUAL] (providing that a
college athlete becomes ineligible if one “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or
indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport”); Amy C. McCormick & Robert A.
McCormick, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 495, 496–97 (2008) (stating the NCAA is a $60,000,000,000 industry);
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Major college athletics have evolved into an $11 billion-
per-year industry, and everyone reaps the benefits,5 except the
athletes. College coaches, for example, receive millions of dollars
in salary alone.6 In fact, head coaches of the most prominent
football programs “earn more than their schools spend on all
athletic scholarships combined” when examining base salary
alone.7 Jim Harbaugh, head coach of the University of
Michigan’s football team, received a salary of over $9 million for
the 2016 season.8 Many men’s college basketball coaches receive
seven-figure compensation packages,9 including John Calipari,
the head coach of the University of Kentucky’s men’s basketball
team, who received over $7.1 million in 2017.10 Even some
assistant football coaches, including three of Michigan’s football
coaching staff, receive a base salary of $1 million a year, while
most assistant football coaches make six figures or more in base
salary.11 Forty-one percent of assistant football coaches received
over $250,000 in base pay without including the multiple
performance bonuses and pay from apparel companies.12
Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the
Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV.
837, 846–47 (2014) (addressing the multibillion dollar industry of major college sports).
5 Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons
Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes’
Rights Movement, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 1627, 1630-31 (2017).
6 2016 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/
ncaa/salaries [https://perma.cc/63DS-Q4J7].
7 Chris Isidore, College Coaches Make More Than Players Get In Scholarship,
CNNMONEY (Jan. 11, 2016, 12:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/11/news/companies/
college-coaches-pay-players-scholarships/index.html [https://perma.cc/28A4-BXSW].
8 2016 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, supra note 6.
9 See 2017 NCAAB Tournament Coaches’ Pay, USA TODAY, http://
sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach [https://perma.cc/LW6F-3R9Z]; see
also 2017 Men’s Basketball Coaches Pay Methodology, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:50
PM), http://sports.usatoday.com/2017/03/28/2017-mens-basketball-coaches-pay-methodology/
[https://perma.cc/K5NU-WD3L] (noting that school pay includes, among other things, salary
and shoe and apparel deals through the school).
10 2017 NCAAB Tournament Coaches’ Pay, supra note 9.
11 See Mark Snyder, Michigan Is First Football Program with 3 Assistants
Making $1M, DET. FREE PRESS (Jan. 24, 2017, 3:55 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/
sports/college/university-michigan/wolverines/2017/01/24/michigan-football-assistants/
97003278/ [https://perma.cc/JU8D-A7PU]; see also Richard Johnson & Jason Kirk,
NCAA Rule Expands Coach Salaries As Player Compensation Remains Unchanged,
SBNATION (Apr. 17, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2017/4/
17/15318478/ncaa-football-10-assistant-coaches-rule-salaries-players [https://perma.cc/C2
P9-E86G] (analyzing the 963 public salaries of assistant coaches and concluding that 81
percent of thosemake six figures ormore in base pay). Nearly 800 assistant football coaches
make six figures, including coaches at the University of Texas San Antonio (UTSA). 2016
NCAAF Assistant Coaches Salaries, USATODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/
football/assistant [https://perma.cc/D56U-NEUG]. The head coach of UTSA’s football team,
notably, received $835,000 in salary alone for the 2016 season. 2016 NCAAF Coaches
Salaries, supra note 6.
12 Johnson & Kirk, supra note 11.
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Many college football and men’s basketball coaches also
receive very large bonuses.13 Most of the listed potential bonuses
for head football coaches range from six figures to seven figures (at
last count, there were thirty-two coaches with potential bonuses of
at least $1 million), with the highest potential bonus reaching over
$3.8 million.14 In 2015, college football coaches received nearly
$12.4 million in bonuses based on championships, bowl game
appearances, postseason awards (e.g., coach of the year), or simply
exceeding the minimum NCAA Academic Progress Rate to avoid
sanctions.15 College basketball coaches also reap the rewards of
performance based bonuses due to, among other measurables, the
number of games won in a season and postseason wins.16
Not only do coaches flourish economically in the
multibillion-dollar industry of football and men’s basketball, but
university athletic directors and NCAA executives also reap the
benefits. Athletic directors often receive six-figure salaries, with
the highest salaried athletic director making over $3.2 million.17
Similarly, the NCAA President reportedly made nearly $2
million in 2014 and other NCAA executives reportedly made
over $400,000 each.18 Universities and donors also pay millions
13 2017 NCAAB Tournament Coaches’ Pay, supra note 9; see also 2016 NCAAF
Assistant Coaches Salaries, supra note 11; 2016 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, supra note 6.
14 2016 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, supra note 6.
15 Steven Berkowitz & Christopher Schnnaars, College Football Coaches Piling
Up More Cash Through Bonuses, USA TODAY (Oct. 8, 2015, 12:43 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2015/10/08/coaches-bonuses-gary-pinkel/73553784/
[https://perma.cc/N9J9-8BRD] (discussing the $12.4 million total for bonuses paid in 2015); see
also College Football Coaches Salaries, NEWSDAY, http://sports.newsday.com/long-island/data/
college/college-football/coaches-salaries/ [https://perma.cc/2LPM-N737] (providing information
on 108 public schools to see “basic salary details along with the incentives and perks for each of
these coaches”). For example,
Utah State’s Matt Wells got $5,000 for his team’s win over in-state rival BYU.
[While at Western Michigan, P.J. Fleck’s bonus] totaled $21,750 from his
players’ individual all-Mid-American Conference team and academic honors.
In addition to the bonuses called for in his contract—which totaled $95,000 and
covered the Broncos’ appearance in the Fiesta Bowl—Boise State’s Bryan
Harsin received an additional $87,875 “for his success last season,” according
to a statement provided by athletics department spokesman Max Corbet.
College Football Coaches Piling Up More Cash Through Bonuses, supra.
16 See Steven Berkowitz, As Always, Big Bonus Bucks in Store for Sweet 16
Coaches, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaab/2017/03/22/sweet-16-coaches-bonuses-march-madness/99494474/ [https://per
ma.cc/C5JP-47PE] (detailing the bonus opportunities for the 2017 Sweet 16 head coaches
and starting bonuses given to basketball coaches for team wins, conference titles, rank,
and post season wins for appearance in NCAA tournament, Sweet 16, Elite Eight, Final
Four, and NCAA title).
17 NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/
all/director [https://perma.cc/9JFC-EX2N]. Many athletic directors also can earn
bonuses, often six-figures for some of them. Id.
18 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Paid Mark Emmert $1.9M in 2014, Tax Return
Shows, USA TODAY (June 23, 2016, 3:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
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of dollars to upgrade their athletic facilities to attract new
recruits and to retain their coaches. For example, Kansas State
completed its new athletic facilities in 2015 at a staggering cost
of $68 million.19 Meanwhile, boosters of the University of
Alabama paid off Nick Saban’s $3.1 million mansion to keep him
happy as the university’s head football coach.20
While everyone else involved enjoys the lush rewards of
major college football and men’s basketball, those providing the
product on the field and court—the athletes—remain forbidden
from earning compensation above their scholarships for playing
their sports.21 Shabazz Napier, a former Most Outstanding
Player of the men’s NCAA basketball tournament,22 told
reporters that, even as he led the University of Connecticut to a
national championship in 2014, he went to bed hungry some
nights.23 He told CNN, “[S]ometimes . . . there’s hungry nights
and I’m not able to eat and I still got to play up to my
capabilities. . . . . When you see your jersey getting sold—it may
not have your last name on it—but when you see your jersey
getting sold and things like that, you feel like you want
something in return.”24 Although the NCAA eventually changed
its policy on scholarship application towards the meal plans for
athletes by allowing unlimited meals, athletes remain the
workhorses for major college sports who may not be hungry now,
but they are still prohibited from earning compensation for
playing.25College athletes should be treated like every other student
at a university: free and encouraged to earn compensation based on
college/2016/06/23/ncaa-tax-return-mark-emmert-jim-isch/86287914 [https://perma.cc/Y
6RV-J9PF] (detailing how much NCAA executives were compensated in 2014).
19 See The Capital Journal,K-State Football Announces Plans for Next Bill Snyder
Family StadiumProject: Next PhaseWill EncloseWildcats’ Football Facility, CJONLINE (Sept.
9, 2015, 10:19 AM), http://cjonline.com/sports/catzone/2015-09-09/k-state-football-announces-
plans-next-bill-snyder-family-stadium-project [https://perma.cc/ZK8H-JVQZ].
20 Alex Scarborough, Bama Boosters Pay Off Saban’s Home, ESPN (Oct. 27,
2014), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/11772033/alabama-crimson-tide-
boosters-pay-coach-nick-saban-home [https://perma.cc/9HYN-ZUE8].
21 See DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 12.1.2. (providing that a college
athlete becomes ineligible if one “[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly)
for pay in any form in that sport”).
22 Sara Ganim, UConn Guard on Unions: I Go To Bed ‘Starving,’ CNN (Apr. 8,
2014, 1:26 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/07/us/ncaa-basketball-finals-shabazz-napier-
hungry/index.html [https://perma.cc/US3K-CRNZ].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Stephen Hobbs, Approved NCAA Rule Allowing Unlimited Meals and Snacks
to Affect Cal Athletes, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.dailycal.org/2014/
04/24/approved-ncaa-rule-allowing-unlimited-meals-snacks-affect-cal-athletes [https://per
ma.cc/W7N6-LACH]; Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Council Approves Meals, Other Student-
Athlete Well-Being Rules, NCAA (Apr. 15, 2014, 4:25 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/council-approves-meals-other-student-athlete-well-being-
rules [https://perma.cc/27ZS-MJ5X]; see also DIVISION 1MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 12.1.2.
2017] THE DUKE MODEL 161
their efforts. Even student musicians, for example, can earn
thousands of dollars by playing at off-campus events, including
when affiliates of the university arrange the performance, without
losing their ability to play in university performances.26
Moreover, college athletes, particularly football players,
subject themselves to intense physical activities and life-altering
injuries while providing the product on the field.27 For example,
a 2017 study conducted by researchers at Boston University and
the VA Boston Healthcare System found that 87 percent of all
football players in the study, which included high school, college,
and professional players, suffered from Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy, commonly known as CTE, which is a life-
threatening condition resulting from repeated concussions.28 The
inherent inequity caused by the NCAA’s prohibition against
athletes earning compensation above their scholarship amounts
despite bringing in billions of dollars smacks of hypocrisy, and
numerous commentators agree.29
In O’Bannon, plaintiffs consisting of current and former
college football players and men’s basketball players sought
compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses in,
among other things, video games.30 A three-judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged how critical college athletes are to the
26 See Karen Crouse, When an Olympian Goes to College, Riches Stay Out of
Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/sports/olympics/
katie-ledecky-olympian-goes-to-college-riches-stay-out-of-reach.html?_r=2 [https://perm
a.cc/2BTV-PWA2]; Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, J.D., ESPN Analyst, Of Counsel,
Moore & Van Allen (July 24, 2015) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas] (on
file with author) (“[E]very other student can make as much money as they want in their
chosen endeavor and it doesn’t affect their academic standing” and “[t]here is no
legitimate reason why an athlete should be any different.”).
27 A.J. Perez, Study: CTE Diagnosed in 99% of Former NFL Players, 87% of
Ex-Players at All Levels, USA TODAY (July 25, 2017), http://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/
nfl/study-cte-diagnosed-in-99percent-of-former-nfl-players-87percent-of-ex-players-at-
all-levels/ar-AAoP6Lf?li=BBnba9I [https://perma.cc/7279-3FFP?type=image].
28 Id.; see also Sam Mellinger, Doctors Couldn’t Find What was Wrong with
Michael Keck, But Football Star Knew it Would Kill Him, KAN. CITYSTAR (Nov. 21, 2015,
9:52 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/sam-mellinger/article
45850180.html [https://perma.cc/ZUE7-EUVG] (examining the death of a twenty-five-
year-old who played in high school and the equivalent of just one year in college who was
diagnosed with CTE).
29 See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 4, at 497–98 (arguing for the
compensation of college athletes above their scholarship amounts); Kathryn Young,
Note, Deconstructing the Façade of Amateurism: Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Arguments in Favor of Compensating Athletes, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 338, 343–47,
352–54 (2013) (stating college athletes should receive more money and incentives
than just their scholarships); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/ [https://perma.cc/9GS3-HC5U] (advocating for the payment of college
athletes).
30 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2015).
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product of major college athletics: “[T]he labor of student-athletes
is an integral and essential component of theNCAA’s ‘product,’ and
a rule setting the price of that labor goes to the heart of the NCAA’s
business.”31 Despite recognizing that college athletes serve as the
first-hand suppliers of the NCAA’s business and product (i.e., the
football and basketball games that the public consumes in droves32)
the Ninth Circuit limited the damages that college athletes could
receive.33 In doing so, the court decided to treat college athletes,
who are adults, differently than every other adult. But in the
United States, both adults and children, are entitled to receive
damages commensurate with their injuries.34
One cannot dispute that education for college athletes
possesses value.35 Nevertheless, some athletes contribute to a
growing industry of major college athletics that generates billions
of dollars of revenue.36 Those athletes who create such a valuable
31 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1066.
32 See College Sports (NCAA)—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, http://www.sta
tista.com/topics/1436/college-sports-ncaa/ [https://perma.cc/W3AN-9XN8] (approximating 49
million people attended college football games in 2012, 106 million people watched at least
one college basketball game on TV in 2014, and 29million people attended at least one college
sports game in 2014). Attendance at the Ohio State University’s 2016 spring practice football
game exceeded 100,000 people. Austin Ward, Ohio State Breaks Own Record for Attendance
in Spring Game, ESPN (Apr. 16, 2016), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/
15217254/ohio-state-breaks-own-record-attendance-spring-game [https://perma.cc/TW5
V-UH52]. This last spring ESPN even broadcasted spring “practice” games for a number of
college football teams. See Every SEC Spring Game to Be Televised, SEC NETWORK, http://
www.secsports.com/article/15048848 [https://perma.cc/7QS5-6XV9] (reporting ESPN or
ESPNU broadcasted spring practices for Alabama, Auburn, and Mississippi); see also Derek
Volner, ESPN3 to Stream Six ACC College Football Spring Games, ESPN MEDIA ZONE
(Mar. 23, 2016), http://espnmediazone.com/us/press-releases/2016/03/espn3-to-stream-six-
acc-college-football-spring-games/ [https://perma.cc/63JB-9LSW] (showing ESPN3 streamed
the spring games for Duke, Kansas, Clemson,Wake Forest, Florida State,Miami, Stephen F.
Austin, and Georgia Tech).
33 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
34 See, e.g., Wiltz v. Brothers Petroleum, LLC, 140 So.3d 758, 787 (La. Ct. App.
2014) (awarding a teenage boy $3 million in damages for suffering brain injury and
paralysis in a drinking and driving car accident).
35 See Val Ackerman & Larry Scott, College Athletes Are Being Educated, Not
Exploited, CNN (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/30/opinions/college-athle
tes-not-exploited-ackerman-scott/ [https://perma.cc/6QSY-C7QS] (contending college
athletes are not being exploited by the millions they are generating for their respective
schools because they are students and are receiving an education); Howard P. Chudacoff,
Let’s Not Pay College Athletes, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/lets-not-pay-college-athletes-1459206949 [https://perma.cc/H63J-
5Z67] (arguing the perks of being a college athlete provides them with the opportunity
to live opulent lifestyles in college and it is unfair for them to be allowed to live so lavishly
while also receiving a free education).
36 See generally Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment,
and the Student-Athlete, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 129 (2012) (describing the unjust
enrichment the universities receive by using players images and likeness without
compensating them); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011)
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/
308643/ [https://perma.cc/92DY-MBM4] (alleging college athletes contribute to the
multibillion dollar industry of college sports, many without pay).
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product should be able to earn compensation for their efforts just
as every other American is entitled to do. The contributions for
some athletes to major college athletics go beyond the value of
scholarships that players receive, and that value beyond
scholarships is what college athletes ought to receive regardless
of their designations as both students and athletes.
The time has long come for the NCAA, its member
institutions, and college athletes to sit down and discuss
compensating college athletes for playing. Rather than continue a
war of words with increasing animosity between college athletes
and the NCAA,37 the parties should take advantage of the existing
infrastructures to begin a discussion that would lead to the
abandonment of the prohibition on compensating athletes and the
adoption of a model for payment. Once the parties begin that
conversation about compensation for college athletes above their
scholarship amounts, this article sets forth a proposal, the “Duke
Model,” that serves as an archetype for how to pay college athletes.
The Duke Model would compensate college athletes in
football and men’s basketball, which are the two revenue-
generating sports,38 based on their performance on and off the
field.39 In particular, the more a player plays, the more that
player earns. The model also includes bonuses for athletic and
academic performance through tangible measurements. The
DukeModel earned its name for several reasons. First, its architect
(i.e., the author of this article) graduated from Duke University
School of Law. Second, the Duke University’s men’s basketball
team (the Blue Devils) represents one of the most prestigious,
successful, and profitable college basketball programs in the
country. Finally, since men’s college basketball is one of the two
sports included in the compensation model, the title is apropos.
37 Former player at Ohio State University, Cardale Jones, took to Twitter to
make his opinion of the NCAA known. Cardale Jones, OHIO ST. BUCKEYES, http://
www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/cardale_jones_753504.html [https://
perma.cc/Z2FD-L46R], see, e.g., Cardale Jones (@Cardale7_), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2016, 9:57
AM), https://twitter.com/CJ12_/status/719569962134847488 [https://perma.cc/3Z5E-7GRM]
(commenting how the NCAA’s rules and regulation exploit college athletes); Cardale Jones
(@Cardale7_), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2016, 10:07 AM), https://twitter.com/CJ12_/status/7195725
62179661826 [https://perma.cc/75HS-PBCN] (alleging “[t]he [NCAA] control[s] [college
athletes’] lives with insane and unfair rules”).
38 See Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths About (Not) Paying
College Athletes, in SELECTED PROC. OF THE SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP. 46, 56–59
(2011) (noting that the football and men’s basketball programs’ revenues typically pay
for the other sports programs at a school); see also Robert A. McCormick & Amy
Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee,
81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 97–98 (2006) (acknowledging football and men’s basketball as the
revenue-generating sports).
39 See infra Part III.
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A one-size-fits-all base compensation and bonus
structure might be affordable to some universities, but not
others, or it may be too little for some schools that could readily
afford more. Moreover, if all schools were required to pay a
certain base salary compensation, some schools might not be
able to afford it, potentially forcing those schools to withdraw
from competition. By using a basic structure with varying
amounts based on how much revenue each conference generates
and how much schools in each conference can actually provide to
their athletes, the Duke Model allows for consistency, a level of
uniformity, predictability, and opportunity for every university
to participate. The Duke Model provides a detailed and
comprehensive compensation structure for athletes that the
parties might agree on if they discussed a compensation system
for athletes in football and men’s basketball.
Part I provides the legal background, including the
O’Bannon case, which demonstrates the pressing need for the
NCAA and its member institutions to address the issue of
compensating college athletes. Part II discusses the advantages
of the Duke Model, and Part III provides the details of the Duke
Model, including its three major parts: (1) base compensation;
(2) athletic bonuses; and (3) academic bonuses. Part IV discusses
the counterarguments to the Model and responds thereto.
Finally, Part V discusses how the existing NCAA structures,
such as Division I governance that includes college athlete
participation in decision-making, provide the framework to
begin a discussion on removing the prohibition on compensating
athletes and developing and implementing the Duke Model,
which will avoid litigation and potential labor complaints and
strikes. This article provides a starting point, if not a complete
model, to discuss how to compensate college athletes.40
40 Although other legal commentators and scholars have discussed models for
paying college athletes, those models lack the specificity and breadth that this model
includes. Robert Grimmett-Norris, Roadblocks: Examining Title IX & the Fair
Compensation of Division I Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 34 ST. LOUISU.PUB. L. REV.
435, 448–56 (2015). The other models include the following: pay-for-play, revenue
sharing, free market, and trust fund. Id. A pay-for-play model would “compensate
student-athletes for their participation in various athletic programs through the
provision of a monthly stipend.” Id. at 448. A revenue sharing model entails requiring
universities to share “with their student-athletes a percentage of the revenues generated
by their respective teams.” Id. at 450. A free market system allows the market to set
“appropriate compensation for each athlete” depending on their skill level. Id. at 452–
53. The trust fund model involves athletes receiving compensation for athletic
competitions, as well as outside incidental activities, but the revenue would be “entered
into a trust fund from which athletes are permitted to withdraw funds.” Id. at 454
(footnote omitted).
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I. RELEVANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part provides background on how antitrust law
intersects with major college athletics, the recent success of
college athletes in the O’Bannon antitrust law case, and the
imminent labor law issue lurking around major college athletics
that can be solved via the Duke Model.
The Sherman Act and the Board of Regents: NCAA
Rules Regarding Major College Athletics Fails an
Antitrust Challenge but Judicial Deference to the
NCAA’s Ability to Govern College Athletes is Solidified
The Sherman Act allows antitrust challenges to NCAA
rules and policies. The Sherman Act, Section 1, makes it illegal
to form any “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States.”41 Since every
contract restrains trade to a certain extent, “the Supreme Court
has limited the restrictions contained in Section 1 to bar only
‘unreasonable restraints of trade.’”42
A plaintiff bringing a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act must show “(1) that there was a contract, combination, or
conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade
under either a per se rule of illegality or a Rule of Reason analysis;
and (3) that the restraint affected interstate commerce.”43 A Rule
of Reason analysis includes a burden-shifting test where “the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement had
a substantially adverse effect on competition.”44 A plaintiff can
show the “anticompetitive effect indirectly by proving that the
defendant possessed the requisite market power within a defined
market or directly by showing actual anticompetitive effects, such
as control over output or price.”45 If the plaintiff satisfies this initial
burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant.46 The defendant
must then establish a procompetitive justification of the challenged
41 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
42 Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)).
43 Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991)).
44 Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
45 Id. at 1019; see also Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
503 (1969) (defining “market power” as “the ability of a single seller to raise price and
restrict output”); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir.
2012) (defining “market power” as “the ability to raise prices significantly without going
out of business” (citation omitted)).
46 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S.
85, 113 (1984); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003).
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restraint for the anticompetitive effect on the free market, which
simply means the restraint promotes competition rather than
destroys it.47 This is a heavy burden for the defendant who must
provide only legitimate procompetitive justifications that, on
balance, actually show “the challenged restraint enhances
competition.”48 For example, “mere profitability or cost savings
have not qualified as a defense under the antitrust laws.”49
In essence, “[u]nder this rule, the fact-finder weighs all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition.”50 One of the main questions that courts
must decide under the Rule of Reason analysis is whether “the
restraint . . . clearly tends to harm competition (as, for example, by
raising prices to consumers or reducing output, product quality, or
innovation), or [does the restraint] actually facilitate more effective
competition or at least leave competition unaffected?”51
The U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Regents of
University of Oklahoma v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
applied a Rule of Reason analysis to college athletics, and courts
continue to do so.52 Board of Regents involved the NCAA’s
47 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 113; Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d
at 238; Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Engineers v. U. S., 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (stating that the
Rule of Reason analyzes whether the challenged restraint promotes competition or
suppresses competition). Legitimate procompetitive objectives include “preventing free
riding, lowering transaction costs, and facilitating other output-promoting transactions,”
as well as “increasing output, creating operating efficiencies, enhancing product or
service quality, and widening consumer choice.” ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC
& JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 988 (2d ed. 2008); RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW:
CASES ANDMATERIALS (7th ed. (2011).
48 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 104.
49 Law, 134 F.3d at 1023. Procompetitive justifications require actual evidence,
while speculative, unsubstantiated, or uncertain claims generally are deemed
insufficient to refute evidence of anticompetitive effects. Andrew I. Gavil,Moving Beyond
Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 733, 774–75 (2012) (analyzing the Rule of Reason test).
50 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
51 1 HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 5:7 (2005); see
generally Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
Courts sometimes use the quick-look approach under the Rule of Reason. Law, 134 F.3d
at 1020. The quick-look approach applies when the challenged restraint involves an
obvious anticompetitive effect, such as an agreement not to compete in terms of price
(price-fixing) or output. If that is the case, then “the court is justified in proceeding
directly to the question of whether the procompetitive justifications advanced for the
restraint outweigh the anticompetitive effects under a ‘quick look’ rule of reason”
analysis. Id.
52 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 103; see also Am. Needle, Inc. v.
Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010) (“The legality of that concerted action
must be judged under the Rule of Reason.”); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
683 F.3d 328, 343 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ither a more searching Rule of Reason analysis
will be necessary to convince us of its procompetitive or anticompetitive nature, or a
quick look at the rule will obviously illustrate its anticompetitiveness.”); Law, 134 F.3d
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previous restrictions in the 1980s concerning televising college
football games.53 The NCAA capped the number of college football
games that could be televised and the number of games that a
school’s team could appear on television.54 Further, any contracts
between television networks and universities needed approval
from the NCAA.55 The Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association
sued the NCAA, claiming that these restraints violated the
Sherman Act.56 The Supreme Court applied a Rule of Reason
analysis and held for the plaintiffs, striking down the NCAA’s
restrictions as anticompetitive without any procompetitive
justifications, and thus in violation of the Sherman Act.57
Board of Regents established an incredible deference to
the NCAA in overseeing all competitive college athletics.58 The
Supreme Court stated that the NCAA must establish:
[R]ules on which the competitors agreed to create and define the
competition to be marketed. A myriad of rules affecting such matters
as the size of the field, the number of players on a team, and the extent
to which physical violence is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must
be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which institutions
compete.59
The Supreme Court noted that the NCAA attempts to sell to the
public a product brand of football, college football, necessarily
at 1020 (“We find it appropriate to adopt such a quick look rule of reason in this case.”);
McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The
essential inquiry under the rule-of-reason analysis is whether the challenged restraint
enhances competition. Applying this test, we have little difficulty in concluding that the
challenged restrictions are reasonable.” (footnote omitted)); In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(“Plaintiffs’ claims in this case must be analyzed under the rule of reason.”); Metro.
Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563,
571 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he summary judgment evidence must be examined in
accordance with ‘rule of reason’ analysis.” (citation omitted)); Pocono Invitational Sports
Camp, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(“I find that there is no per se restraint and will apply rule of reason analysis.”).
53 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 91–92.
54 Id. at 94.
55 Id. at 91–92.
56 Id. at 95.
57 Id. at 113, 120.
58 See id. at 117 (giving deference to the NCAA); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 802 F.3d 1049, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2015) (deferring to the NCAA);
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 347 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs case
because they failed to find “a relevant market for student-athlete labor”); Rock v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021–22 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (holding
“[p]laintiff’s proposed market is impermissibly narrow” and “not legally cognizable”);
Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (showing
deference to the NCAA’s rulemaking activity since “the NCAA’s action does not
constitute an unreasonable restraint under the Sherman Act”).
59 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 101.
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identified with and included in an academic tradition.60 The
Supreme Court asserted that “to preserve the character and
quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like.”61 According to the Board
of Regents Court, “the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college
football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a
product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.”62
Board of Regents also established the Rule of Reason as the
proper analysis for analyzing the business of major college athletics.
Nearly thirty years later, the O’Bannon court followed suit when
analyzing theNCAA’s rules regarding college athlete compensation.
The O’Bannon Case Analyzes the NCAA’s Prohibition
Against College Athlete Compensation and Finds an
Antitrust Violation but Limits the Compensation
Athletes Can Receive
The O’Bannon case, although focused on the athlete’s
name, image, and likeness, provides useful guidance because it
analyzed whether college athletes could receive compensation
above their scholarship amounts.63 While the Ninth Circuit
determined that the NCAA’s amateurism rules prohibiting
compensation up to the full cost of attendance violated antitrust
law, the court still prevented athlete compensation beyond the
full cost of attendance.64
The plaintiffs in O’Bannon sought “to challenge the set of
rules that preclude FBS football players and Division I men’s
basketball players from receiving any compensation . . . for the
use of their names, images, and likeness in videogames, live
game telecasts, re-broadcasts, and archival game footage.”65 The
district court held that the NCAA’s compensation rules that
prohibit college athletes from receiving compensation for the use
of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs) violated the
Sherman Act and constituted an unlawful anticompetitive
effect.66 As a result, the district court ordered two permanent
60 Id. at 101–02.
61 Id. at 102.
62 Id.
63 See infra note 30–33and accompanying text.
64 See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2015).
65 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D.
Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
66 Id. For example, a college athlete’s NIL would include his name on a jersey,
his image and likeness in video games, and his appearance in a Sprite commercial
endorsing that product.
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injunctions: (1) the NCAA could not prevent its member
institutions from providing full cost of attendance scholarships;
and (2) the NCAA could not prohibit its member institutions
from providing their athletes up to $5,000 from the shared
revenue that would be placed in trust for athletes, which could
be collected by the athletes after graduation.67 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the NCAA violated the
college athletes’ rights under the Sherman Act by upholding the
first permanent injunction against the NCAA that allowed
member institutions to provide athletes full cost of attendance
scholarships. Yet the Ninth Circuit vacated the second
injunction that allowed member institutions to pay athletes up
to $5,000 per year of deferred compensation, reasoning that it
was “untethered to educational expenses.”68
Under the Rule of Reason, both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied their initial
burden by showing that the NCAA’s prohibition on athletes
receiving compensation for the use of their NILs constituted a
significant anticompetitive effect on the relevant market. In
particular, the courts deemed the relevant market as the college
education market where “colleges compete for the services of
athletic recruits by offering them scholarships and various
amenities, such as coaching and facilities.”69 If the NCAA
prohibition did not exist, then the NCAA’s member institutions
would compete with each other by paying the college athletes for
their “[NILs] as a part of obtaining the services of college
athletes; instead, the prohibition functions as a price-fixing
mechanism where the member institutions agree to pay the
college athletes nothing for their NILs.”70 Also, “[a]bsent the
NCAA’s compensation rules, video game makers would
negotiate with student-athletes for the right to use their NILs.”71
Looking at the second prong of the Rule of Reason
analysis, the district court and the Ninth Circuit both accepted
the NCAA’s procompetitive justification of amateurism, which is
discussed at length in the following Section.72 The courts’
analysis then shifted to the last part of the Rule of Reason
analysis regarding less restrictive alternatives. The district
court identified two: “(1) allowing NCAA member schools to give
student-athletes grants-in-aid that cover the full cost of
67 Id. at 989, 1007–09.
68 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053, 1078.
69 Id. at 1070.
70 Id. at 1052, 1069.
71 Id. at 1067.
72 Id. at 1072; infra Section I.C.
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attendance; and (2) allowing member schools to pay student-
athletes small amounts of deferred cash compensation for use of
their NILs.”73 TheNinth Circuit held “that the district court did not
clearly err in finding that raising the grant-in-aid cap would be a
substantially less restrictive alternative, but that it clearly erred
when it found that allowing students to be paid compensation for
their NILs is virtually as effective as the NCAA’s current
amateur-status rule.”74 TheNinth Circuit prohibited compensation
for college athletes above their scholarship amounts, opining that
compensation tied to college athletes’ educational expenses ismuch
different from compensation for college athletes “untethered” to
educational expenses.75
O’Bannon provided a blueprint for pending cases not yet
decided, such as Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.76
In Jenkins, plaintiffs’ purported class action consists of college
football and men’s basketball players suing the NCAA and the
Power Five conferences.77 The named plaintiffs, “four current
top-tier college football and men’s basketball players,” are suing
on behalf of similarly situated college athletes who “are exploited
by Defendants and their member institutions under false claims
of amateurism.”78
The Jenkins complaint alleges that defendants “entered
into what amounts to cartel agreements with the avowed purpose
and effect of placing a ceiling on the compensation thatmay be paid
to these athletes for their services.”79 The Jenkins plaintiffs seek a
free market model to compensate college athletes based on the
illegal antitrust activities of the NCAA and the Power Five
conferences.80 If the plaintiffs in Jenkins prevail, universities may
73 Id. at 1074 (citing O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,7 F. Supp. 3d
955, 1005–07 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1078.
76 See Complaint and Jury Demand-Class Action Seeking Injunction and Individual
Damagesat2–3, 40Jenkinsv.Nat’lCollegiateAthleticAss’n,No.14CV01678,2014WL1008526
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Jenkins v. NCAA Complaint] (contending that NCAA rules
deprive the college athletes “of the ability to receive market value for their services as college
football andmen’s basketball players in a free and openmarket”).
77 See id. at 1–2. The Jenkins case is pending before the same Court that held
for the plaintiffs in the O’Bannon case, the Northern District of California. In re Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1366,
1367 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (transferring the case from the District of New Jersey to the
Northern District of California by a multidistrict litigation panel because three of the
other six antitrust cases against the NCAA were already pending in the Northern
District of California).
78 Id. Jenkins v. NCAA Complaint, supra note 76, at 2–3.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2–3, 40 (asserting that the “restrictions are pernicious, a blatant
violation of the antitrust laws, have no legitimate pro-competitive justification, . . . should
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have to pay college athletes much higher salaries in a free market
system than what is proposed in the Duke Model.
Courts Continue to Accept the NCAA’s Weak
Amateurism Defense to Prohibit Compensation above
Scholarship Amounts
The NCAA’s argument regarding amateurism boils down
to this: if college athletes are paid to play, then they are no
longer amateurs, which will change the nature of the product
(i.e., the games) resulting in less consumer demand, meaning
fewer people watching the games. The NCAA commissioned a
study in O’Bannon to try to demonstrate that consumers
generally oppose payment for college athletes.81
The relevant finding of the study showed that consumers,
regardless of whether they self-identified as sports fans or
simply members of the general public, tended to approve less of
payment for college athletes the higher the potential payment
amount rose for athletes.82 For instance, 38 percent of the
general public said they would be less likely to view or attend
games if college athletes were paid $20,000 a year.83 Sixty-two
percent of the general public indicated they would feel no more
or less likely to view or attend games.84 About 4 to 5 percent of
the general public showed they would be more likely to view or
attend games if college athletes were paid.85 Disapproval rates
increased as payment levels increased as follows: (1) disapproval
rate at the $20,000 level: 38 percent for the general public and
36 percent for the fans; (2) disapproval rate at the $50,000 level:
47 percent for general public and 52 percent for the fans; and
(3) disapproval rate at the $200,000 level: 53 percent for general
public and 62 percent for fans.86
Despite the NCAA’s heavy reliance on the purported
findings of the study, the study suffered from several fatal flaws,
including how “the survey’s initial question skewed the results
by priming respondents to think about illicit payments to
now be struck down and enjoined[,]” and prevent college athletes from “receiv[ing] market
value for their services . . . in a free and open market”).
81 Transcript of Record at 2603–05, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (No. 266) [hereinafter June 24th
Transcript of Record] (showing Dr. Michael Dennis’ survey results on how the paying of
college athletes affect demand, particularly in “viewing and attending college football
games and basketball games”).
82 See id. at 2651–52.
83 Id. at 2651.
84 Id. at 2651–52.
85 Id. at 2652.
86 Id. at 2652–54.
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student-athletes rather than the possibility of allowing athletes
to be [legally] paid.”87 The district court in O’Bannon found the
study unpersuasive.88 The study suffered further criticism from
plaintiffs’ expert witness, Daniel Rascher, who discussed previous
surveys regarding consumer demand.89 Those respective surveys
involved expected consumer demand (the consumers being the
fans) in anticipation of professional baseball players’ salaries
skyrocketing in the 1970s and professional athletes competing in
the Olympics.90 In both surveys, consumers indicated they would
watch baseball and the Olympics less once the salaries increased
in baseball and once professionals competed in the Olympics.91
But data showed the opposite to be true: viewership actually
increased after the players’ salaries rose and once professional
athletes began participating in the Olympics.92
The district court also attacked the NCAA’s argument
that amateurism served as a proper procompetitive
justification.93 Judge Claudia Wilken found that “the NCAA has
revised its rules governing student-athlete compensation
numerous times over the years, sometimes in significant and
contradictory ways.”94 Judge Wilken noted that the NCAA’s
“current rules demonstrate that, even today, the NCAA does not
consistently adhere to a single definition of amateurism.”95
Despite its harsh criticism, the district court noted that “some
restrictions on compensation may still serve a limited
procompetitive purpose if they are necessary to maintain the
popularity of FBS football and Division I basketball,” finding
87 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir.
2015) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
88 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 975–76 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
89 Id. at 976–77.
90 See Transcript of Record at 901–06, O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal.
June 17, 2014) (4:09-cv-03329-CW).
91 See id.
92 See id.; see also O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1081. (Thomas, S., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (showing the correlation of viewership to the payment of athletes).
93 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999–1001.
94 Id. at 1000.
95 Id. The district court explained:
A Division I tennis recruit can preserve his amateur status even if he accepts
ten thousand dollars in prize money the year before he enrolls in college. A
Division I track and field recruit, however, would forfeit his athletic eligibility
if he did the same. Similarly, an FBS football player may maintain his amateur
status if he accepts a Pell grant that brings his total financial aid package
above the cost of attendance. But the same football player would no longer be
an amateur if he were to decline the Pell grant and, instead, receive an
equivalent sum of money from his school for the use of his name, image, and
likeness during live game telecasts. Such inconsistencies are not indicative of
“core principles.”
Id.
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however that there were less restrictive means to achieve this
procompetitive justification.96
The Ninth Circuit instead embraced the procompetitive
justification of amateurism stating, “the amateur nature of
collegiate sports increases their appeal to consumers.”97 The
Ninth Circuit asserted, “not paying student-athletes is precisely
what makes them amateurs.”98 Quoting the Supreme Court in
the Board of Regents, the Ninth Circuit opined that amateurism
allows the “market for college football” to remain “distinct from
other sports markets and must be ‘differentiate[d]’ from
professional sports lest it become ‘minor league [football].’”99
Traditional notions that college athletes should remain
unpaid are undercut by several factors, including the rise of
college athletics as a multibillion dollar industry and the
important labor law concerns at issue. The Ninth Circuit
admitted that college athletes provide the essential labor for the
product of major college athletics, and General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserts that college
athletes, namely football players, are employees under the
National Labor Relations Act.100 If the NLRB deemed football
players “employees” in an actual case before the NLRB, then it
would create incredible instability within the NCAA as the
NLRA only applies to private institutions and only 17 of the 125
college football teams in the FBS are private.101 As a result, a
small percentage of football players (i.e., the players at private
institutions) would be considered employees under the NLRA
(and likely eligible for payment with the ability to unionize and
strike),102 while most college football players (i.e., the players at
public universities and colleges) would not be considered
employees. The NCAA previously changed its policies or adopted
96 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (acknowledging that “‘maximiz[ing]
consumer demand for the product’ is a legitimate procompetitive justification”
(alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 119–20 (1984)).
97 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.
98 Id. at 1076 (emphasis in original).
99 Id. at 1076–77 (alteration in original) (quotingBd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102).
100 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir.
2015); NAT’L LABOR& RELATIONS BD., GENERAL COUNSEL’S REPORT ON THE STATUTORY
RIGHTS OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND STUDENTS IN THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
CONTEXT, 22–23 (2017), https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582342bfc
[https://perma.cc/N99B-RM36] [hereinafter GENERAL COUNSEL’S REPORT].
101 See Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at 5-6 (2015). This instability is one of
the reasons the full NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Northwestern
football players’ attempt to unionize, as Northwestern is the only private institution in
the Big 10 Conference. See id.
102 See, e.g., GENERAL COUNSEL’S REPORT, supra note 100, at 20–22.
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new ones in the face of litigation or other external threats.103 The
Duke Model embraces the reality of major college athletics and
provides an equitable and manageable approach to compensating
college athletes. The next Part addresses the advantages of the
Duke Model before discussing its intricacies.
II. ADVANTAGES OF THEDUKEMODEL
The advantages of the Duke Model are plentiful, starting
with the flexibility relating to the different forms and varying
amounts of compensation that conferences and players can
choose to adopt. The Duke Model includes three categories of
compensation: (1) base salary; (2) athletic bonuses; and
(3) academic bonuses. Conferences, depending on their available
resources and their priorities, could choose to compensate their
athletes using any of the three categories, any combination of
the three categories, or all three categories. Conferences could
also choose the amounts they pay the athletes based on the
particular member schools’ ability to pay.
The NCAA itself would also benefit from a system of
payment created with the players, conferences, and the NCAA
for several reasons. First, the NCAA would avoid the negative
press and costs of continuing antitrust litigation brought on
behalf of college athletes.104 Second, if college athletes prevailed
in any of those antitrust cases, a free market might be much
more costly to universities than a controlled DukeModel.105 For the
same reasons the NCAA does, its member institutions also benefit
from a compensation model, as conferences find themselves as
defendants in antitrust caseswith theNCAA.106Adopting theDuke
Model also forestalls any efforts by theNLRB to rule officially that
college athletes are employees,107 and it would likely prevent
103 See, e.g., infra notes 253-255 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., Jenkins v. NCAA Complaint, supra note 76, at 2 (involving football
and men’s basketball players seeking a free market system of payment for college
athletes beyond their scholarship amounts).
105 Moreover, if the governing bodies of the NCAA chose to pay college athletes
in some form under the Duke Model, the parties could negotiate to change the terms and
payment structure. Arguably, since such payment would be voluntary and not court-
ordered, the NCAA could stop allowing the compensation of athletes. But once a
compensation model is negotiated, implemented, and agreed to it would be difficult for
the NCAA to reverse that decision entirely.
106 See, e.g., Jenkins v. NCAA Complaint, supra note 76, at 1 (showing the
Power Five conferences as defendants).
107 On January 31, 2017, Richard Griffin, Jr., General Counsel of the NLRB
(General Counsel), sent a memorandum to regional directors and officers of the NLRB,
resolving the issue of whether Division I FBS scholarship football players at private
institutions are considered employees pursuant to the NLRA. GENERAL COUNSEL’S
REPORT, supra note 100, at 1–2 (“This Report also addresses the question left open in
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Division I FBS scholarship athletes at private colleges and
universities from bringing a labor complaint or striking.108
Moreover, the NCAA avoids any potential government
pressure through legislation requiring member institutions to
pay college athletes or through Department of Justice
investigations involving antitrust laws. For example, in 2011,
“the United States Justice Department announced an
investigation to determine whether the NCAA’s prohibition on
scholarships violates antitrust laws. Spontaneously, the NCAA
changed the bylaw prohibiting multi-year scholarships in 2011
before the Justice Department completed its investigation. . . .”109
Furthermore, some members of Congress have already
shown great interest in college athletics in the past, even going
so far as to introduce legislation that would have removed the
now-defunct Bowl Championship Series (the BCS) and created
a college football playoff.110 Eventually, the BCS did give way to
the college football playoff. The first ever college football playoff
began with controversy when top-tier teams Baylor University
Northwestern University, and sets forth the General Counsel’s position on whether
scholarship football players at NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (‘FBS’)
private colleges and universities are employees under the NLRA . . . .”). General Counsel
determined unequivocally that these football players are employees under the NLRA. Id.
at 16 (“[W]e conclude that scholarship football players in Division I FBS private sector
colleges and universities are employees under the NLRA, with the rights and protections
of that Act.”). The General Counsel’s memorandum is not a binding ruling or decision,
but it provides guidance for “employers, labor unions, and employees that summarizes
[NLRB] law . . . and explains how the office of the General Counsel will apply these
representational decisions in the unfair labor practice arena.” Id. at 1; see also Old
Harbor Native Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 104 T.C. 191, 206–07 (1995) (“First,
a general counsel memorandum is not binding precedent on this Court. A general counsel
memorandum is a legal opinion from one division of the Commissioner’s Office of Chief
Counsel to another.” (citation omitted)).
108 The General Counsel indicates that Division I FBS football players at
private institutions are afforded the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA even if they
never choose to “form or support a union.” GENERALCOUNSEL’SREPORT, supra note 100,
at 21 (“Section 7 protections [are] afforded to all unorganized private sector employees
who may never elect to form or support a union.”). Section 7 provides employees with the
“right to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection,” which includes
striking. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); The
Right to Strike, NAT’L LABOR REL. BOARD (July 31, 2017), https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes
[https://perma.cc/LPS8-R7ZB] (“Strikes are included among the concerted activities
protected for employees by [Section 7].”).
109 Randy Haight, Alleging an Anticompetitive Impact on a Discernible Market:
Changing the Antitrust Landscape for Collegiate Athletics, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 19, 32 (2014) (footnote omitted) (finding suspicion in the abrupt change in
the NCAA bylaws); Which Schools Offer Multi-Year Athletic Scholarships?, GO BIG
RECRUITING (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.gobigrecruiting.com/blog/2014/09/schools-
offer-multi-year-athletic-scholarships/ [http://perma.cc/5U6Y-X27C] (stating a common
complaint of college athletes is the restriction of scholarships).
110 Rick Klein, Rep. Joe Barton: College Football Playoff Will ‘Fail Every Year’;
Congress May Examine Next Year, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014, 5:25 PM), http:/
/abcnews.go.com/Politics/rep-joe-barton-college-football-playoff-fail-year/story?id=
27568131 [https://perma.cc/T7VB-AF5Y].
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and Texas Christian University failed to receive a bid to play in
the national semifinal college playoff.111 Republican Joe Barton
of Texas, who “previously used his perch as chairman of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee to convene hearings on
the much-maligned BCS, even pushing legislation to prod the
NCAA to ban it in favor of a playoff system,” wanted further
hearings on the new system to add more teams to the four-team
playoff.112 As the push for college athlete compensation continues
to gain steam and shows no signs of slowing,113 particularly when
revenues and television deals (such as the $8.8 billion extension of
the NCAA’s and CBS Sports’ (CBS) and Turner Broadcasting
System Inc.’s (TBS) agreement for the men’s NCAA tournament)
111 Chuck Culpepper, College Football Playoff Field Set but Controversy Lingers
with Ohio State in, TCU Snubbed, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2014/12/07/college-football-playoff-field-set-
ohio-state-in-tcu-snubbed/?utm_term=.fd7622a7f42d [https://perma.cc/ZWZ2-LRGE].
112 Klein, supra note 110.
113 See, e.g., ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR
HIRE: THE EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA’S AMATEUR MYTH 23 (1998); Ellen J.
Staurowsky, Piercing the Veil of Amateurism: Commercialisation, Corruption and US
College Sports, in THE COMMERCIALISATION OF SPORT 143 (Trevor Slack ed., 2004);
Amber Jorgensen, Why Collegiate Athletes Could Have the NCAA Singing a Different
Tune, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 367, 369 (2015); Michael H. LeRoy, An Invisible
Union for an Invisible Labor Market: College Football and the Union Substitution Effect,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2012); Cesar F. Rosado Marzan & Alex Tillett-Saks,Work,
Study, Organize!: Why the Northwestern University Football Players Are Employees
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301, 301–04
(2015); McCormick & McCormick, supra note 4, at 495–96; McCormick & McCormick,
supra note 38, at 71–72; Michael J. Mondello & Joseph Beckham,Workers’ Compensation
and Collegiate Athletes: The Debate Over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint, 31 J.L.
& EDUC. 293, 295 (2002); Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete:
Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges,
24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 25 (2000); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of
Sport: Amateurism and Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 25 (1991); Ellen J.
Staurowsky, “A Radical Proposal”: Title IX Has No Role in College Sport Pay-for-Play
Discussions, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 575 (2012); Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes
as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 65, 65 (2014); Michael P.
Acain, Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College
Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 307 (1998); Michael A. Corgan, Comment,
Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial
Corruption of College Athletics Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’S
Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS& ENT. L.J. 371, 372 (2012); Jamie Nicole
Johnson, Note, Removing the Cloak of Amateurism: Employing College Athletes and
Creating Optional Education, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 959 (2015); Jay D. Lonick, Note,
Bargaining with the Real Boss: How the Joint-Employer Doctrine Can Expand Student-
Athlete Unionization to the NCAA as an Employer, 15 VA. SPORTS&ENT. L.J. 135, 139–
40 (2015) (arguing for athlete compensation); Charlotte M. Rasche, Note, Can
Universities Afford to Pay for Play? A Look at Vicarious Liability Implications of
Compensating Student Athletes, 16 REV. LITIG. 219, 240 (1997); Jeffrey Dorfman,
Pay College Athletes? They’re Already Paid up to $125,000 Per Year, FORBES (Aug. 29,
2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2013/08/29/pay-college-
athletes-theyre-already-paid-up-to-125000year/ [http://perma.cc/Z9EX-73JY] (“[T]he
best college athletes gain valuable publicity from playing college athletics.”); Sean
Gregory, It’s Time to Pay College Athletes, TIME (Sept. 16, 2013), http://content.time.com/
time/subscriber/article/0,33009,2151167,00.html [https://perma.cc/Z7RL-GXHK].
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continue to soar, the government may feel compelled to intervene,
making the Duke Model a favorable option for the NCAA.114
The players obviously benefit from the Duke Model
because they earn based on their performances and
contributions to a multibillion dollar industry. There are a
number of advantages, both direct and indirect, stemming from
compensating college athletes above their scholarship amount.
First, fairness and equity dictate that the laborers and direct
providers of a product that generates billions of dollars should
be compensated properly. Second, college athletes may stay
longer in school if they were receiving compensation and bonuses
while in school.115 College athletes could earn money for their
families and themselves, which may be extremely attractive for
athletes from disadvantaged backgrounds or with lower
socioeconomic statuses.116 If the college athlete did stay in school
longer, then he would benefit by maturing during that time.117
Also, if the school paid bonuses for graduation, then that might
also incentivize athletes to stay in school.
The Duke Model could also be applied to Division II and
III conferences. Conferences in those divisions could choose to
adopt any aspects of the Duke Model at whatever fraction of the
original amounts that those conferences could afford. Moreover,
the conferences and players could revisit the amounts detailed
in the Duke Model every five years to adjust, if necessary, for
drastic increases or decreases in the revenues and sources of
reallocation. This periodic review ensures that colleges and
universities are able to compensate athletes in a fiscally
responsible manner that is fair to the athletes, which will
depend on whether the revenues are increasing, decreasing, or
staying relatively constant. If there are changes in revenue, the
amount of compensation changes.
Furthermore, the Duke Model could be used to
compensate female athletes. Some conferences, such as the
American Athletic Conference where the University of
Connecticut women’s basketball team resides, may determine
114 SeeEric Brady,NCAAExtends Tournament Deal with CBS, Turner Through
2032 for $8.8 Billion, USA TODAY (Apr. 12, 2016, 2:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/ncaab/2016/04/12/ncaa-contract-extension-cbs-turner-ncaa-tournament-
march-madness/82939124/ [https://perma.cc/3A2P-XJMK] (discussing the $8.8 billion
extension).
115 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015).
116 Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, supra note 26.
117 See Jaimie Duffek, Relative Age Effect: Is When You Are Born More
Important Than How Good You Will Be?, USA TODAY (May 3, 2017), http://
usatodayhss.com/2017/relative-age-effect-is-when-you-are-born-more-important-than-how-
good-you-will-be (finding that maturity is most likely a factor that plays a role in the athlete’s
future success).
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that revenues in female athletics would enable female sports
teams to receive compensation under a variation of the Duke
Model. Some conferences and their players might determine
that, rather than base compensation, the academic bonuses or
athletic bonuses or both are feasible financially and best reflect
the excellence sought by female athletes in certain conferences.
For example, conferences could adopt academic bonuses in
women’s swimming in Conference USA. Another possibility is
that universities spend more money on female athletic programs
in proportion to the increase in spending on base compensation,
bonuses for football and men’s basketball, or both, which would
improve women’s college athletics and certainly align with Title
IX, which is discussed in Section IV. The variations and
possibilities of the Duke Model make it a highly attractive
possibility for compensating college athletes. The next Part
provides the details of how the Duke Model functions.
III. THEDUKEMODEL: A PERFORMANCE-BASED SOLUTION
The Duke Model represents a novel approach to
compensating college athletes based exclusively on how the
athlete performs. The model includes a base compensation,
derived from the performance of the athlete, bonuses for athletic
performance, and bonuses for academic performance. The Duke
Model is loosely based on the professional athlete payment
model as it includes a base salary and potential bonuses.118 The
base salary for professional athletes, though, is not based
entirely on their actual performance; it reflects on how they
performed in the past and a prediction on how they will perform
in the future.119 Other models proposed by legal commentators
and scholars fail to set up a system based entirely on
performance, and they also lack the specificity and breadth that
the Duke Model includes.120
The Duke Model would also likely overcome a Rule of
Reason analysis because, although a restraint would exist on
how much a player could make because of the limits set, those
118 See Joel Corry, Agent’s Take: Notable Players Who Cashed in on Performance
Bonuses, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/agents-take-
notable-players-who-cashed-in-on-performance-bonuses [https://perma.cc/PW5T-26RB]
(noting performance bonuses, in the ways of incentives and salary escalators, are
awarded to professionals in accordance with their contract and performance).
119 See Lindsey Adler, Here’s What NBA Players Really Deserve to Make, DAILY
DOT (July 23, 2015, 8:00 AM) https://www.dailydot.com/sports/most-overpaid-nba-
players/ [https://perma.cc/D7UN-HF87] (showing the difference between what NBA
players’ salaries are versus howmuch they would get paid on a pure performance model).
120 Grimmett-Norris, supra note 40.
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limits possess a procompetitive justification to maintain a level
playing field and competitive balance amongst the teams in each
conference.121 For example, if a team in a conference could set its
own limits on compensation under the Duke Model, then the
university with the richest donors and most avid football fans
would attract all of the best players because it could offer the
most money to players. By allowing conferences to set their own
limits, particularly with the same number for the Power Five
conferences, those conferences will remain competitive within
their conference and amongst the Power Five conferences. If a
non-Power Five conference adopts the Duke Model but in a
limited form, such as 50 percent or 75 percent of the values that
the Power Five conferences adopt, then those other conferences
may not attract the same caliber of players as Power Five
conferences, but they do not attract those players anyway under
today’s system. In evaluating the Duke Model, a court would
look favorably on the compensation of college athletes when they
are providing the labor for a product that generates billions of
dollars, the procompetitive restraints on the amounts that
athletes could earn, and the fact that conferences would only pay
what they could afford.
In any event, as a former Division I athlete, the author of
this article contends that this form of payment would be
appealing to college athletes who view sports as a meritocracy
where one should receive what they earn. Prior to discussing the
three areas of compensation based on performance—base salary,
athletic bonuses, and academic bonuses—some of the other
rationale of the model must be explained.
The NCAA Would Provide Basic Oversight for the Duke
Model, Which Would Function at the Conference Level
Under the Duke Model, the NCAA would serve as the
purveyor of information regarding all finances of the conferences
and schools. The NCAA would work with each conference to
determine appropriate amounts of compensation based on the
revenues generated by each conference, the ability of each school
in the conference to pay, and the priorities of the conference with
121 Moreover, the NCAA, its member institutions, and players could seek an
exemption from federal and state antitrust laws that might view any limitations on
player compensation as violating antitrust law. SeeMatthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross,
A Regulatory Solution to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic
Sustainability of Intercollegiate Athletics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837, 874–75 (2014) (creating a
new federal regulatory scheme for college athletics and proposing an antitrust exemption
to help do so).
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regard to payment. The priorities of certain conferences, for
example, might be to compensate college athletes based solely
on academic bonuses, other conferences may choose to
compensate college athletes using only athletic bonuses, while
others still may choose to compensate using all three areas—
base compensation, athletic bonuses, and academic bonuses.
Each school would need to submit its financial data to the
NCAA to help facilitate this process, which would include all of
the revenue streams and expenses for each school, such as
revenue from television contracts, ticket sales, and expenses for
athletic directors’ and coaches’ salaries, facilities, and staff
salaries.122 The NCAA already maintains the NCAA fund that is
based on its multibillion contract and extension with CBS and
TBS that allows the networks to broadcast the NCAA Division I
men’s basketball tournament (NCAA basketball tournament).123
The NCAA would serve as a fact-finding instrument that
works with all of the conferences to help determine how much a
conference and its individual schools could pay athletes, while
still attempting to keep the compensation at a level in line with
the NCAA’s purported issue with consumer demand concerns.124
Those concerns, according to the NCAA, involve the notion that
the more a college athlete is paid, the less people will watch
college sports.125 As set forth above, however, this argument
lacks solid evidentiary support. Moreover, the average consumer
would likely not be offended when a college athlete, who helps
generate millions of dollars for his university while appearing on
SportsCenter highlights and nationally televised games, earns a
five-figure compensation above his scholarship amount based
solely on his performance.
Implementation of the Duke Model would most likely
occur at the conference level for several reasons. First, the
university’s payment of its athletes should be based on how
much money the university has available to pay its athletes,
understanding that money may be reallocated from coaches’
122 The NCAA already receives this information for numerous public schools
that are required to release revenue and expense reports for their athletic departments.
See USA Today Sports, Methodology for 2016 NCAA Athletic Department Revenue
Database, USA TODAY (July 6, 2017, 12:36 PM), http://sports.usatoday.com/2017/07/06/
methodology-for-2016-ncaa-athletic-department-revenue-database/ [https://perma.cc/6P
YB-AU5C].
123 CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14-Year Agreement, NCAA
(Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-turner-
broadcasting-ncaa-reach-14-year-agreement [https://perma.cc/B6ZH-AJKR]; Will Hobson,
Fund and Games, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/sports/ncaa-money/ [https://perma.cc/4ALN-RMML].
124 See discussion supra Part I.
125 See discussion supra Part I.
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salaries, athletic department personnel salaries, and money
spent on facilities. Each university generates a different amount
of revenue, some of which includes monies that are earned and
shared based on conference-wide television contracts,
performance in the men’s NCAA basketball tournament, and the
college football playoff system. For example, conferences such as
the Pac 12, Big 10, SEC, and ACC share in the revenue from
television contracts for football in their respective conferences.126
Also, the NCAA pays out money from its basketball fund
based on, among other things, how well the conferences’ schools
perform in the NCAA tournament.127 Each game played in the
2017 NCAA tournament was worth roughly $266,000.128 The
conferences split the money earned amongst its members.129 The
ACC, by virtue of so many of its teams advancing far in the
tournament in 2015, 2016, and 2017, earned over $100 million
for those three years.130 The basketball fund comes from the
NCAA’s original $10.8 billion television contracts with CBS and
TBS.131 Those parties reached agreement on the extension of that
contract at $8.8 billion for CBS and TBS to broadcast the
tournament through 2032.132 Similarly, the college football playoff
system rewards conferences in the Power Five conferences with a
set amount, as well as conferences whose teams qualify for the
four-team college semifinals and non-playoff bowl games under
this system.133 Several other conferences, known as the Group of
Five, also receive a set amount, but far less than the Power
126 Jason Alsher, 5 College Conferences that Bring in Over $250 Million,
CHEATSHEET (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.cheatsheet.com/sports/the-5-most-valuable-
conferences-in-college-sports.html [https://perma.cc/SD9M-6FRG].
127 See Hobson, supra note 123 (providing that NCAA payouts increase the
better a team performs).
128 Michael Rogner,Economics of the 2017NCAATournament, TOMAHAWKNATION
(Mar. 14, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.tomahawknation.com/2017/3/14/14918106/money-
finances-2017-ncaa-tournament-basketball [https://perma.cc/NF29-N9M7].
129 Id.; Darren Rovell, ACC on Track to Shatter Record for Money Earned in
NCAA Tournament, ESPN (Mar. 25, 2016), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/
story/_/id/15071018/atlantic-coast-conference-set-shatter-record-money-earned-ncaa-
men-basketball-tournament [https://perma.cc/4J75-EAAF].
130 Tim Daniels, ACC Set to Make Combined $100 Million from Last 3 NCAA
Tournaments, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 31, 2017), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2701113-acc-set-to-make-combined-100-million-from-last-3-ncaa-tournaments [http://
perma.cc/Y6C7-KE84].
131 CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14-Year Agreement,
supra note 123.
132 See Brady, supra note 114.
133 Revenue Distribution, C. FOOTBALL PLAYOFF, https://www.collegefootball
playoff.com/revenue-distribution [https://perma.cc/K7PE-EYLX] (2016–2017 figure
found on linked PDF); see also Kristi Dosh, College Football Playoff Payouts by
Conference for 2016–17, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kristidosh/2016/12/31/college-football-playoff-payouts-by-conference-for-2016-17/#83e
7bf572d4a [https://perma.cc/9JVZ-6X9H].
182 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
Five’s payout.134 Notably, the college football playoff pays out
over $500 million total.135
Conferences, in any event, generate varying amounts of
revenue.136 For example, the Southeastern Conference generated
over $122 million in revenue for football in 2014–2015, and the
Pac-12 Conference generated over $81 million in revenue in
134 The Group of Five conferences include the following: “American Athletic
Conference, Conference USA, Mid-American Conference, Sun Belt Conference, and the
Mountain West Conference.” See Bill Bender, Power 5 vs. Group of 5: College Football’s
Split Decision, SPORTING NEWS (June 9, 2014), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-
football/news/power-5-conferences-autonomy-ncaa-group-of-5-nick-saban-mike-slive-
division-iv-split/1l51s8k6rrjvi1gph46mditvr8 [https://perma.cc/SF29-BJG7]; Dosh,
supra note 133. Other payments under the college football playoff system include: (1) a
set amount for each conference (for 2017–2018 it is $300,000) for each of its school’s
football teams that meets the NCAA’s APR (Academic Progress Rate) for participation
in a postseason football game, and each independent institution also receives a set
amount (the $300,000 in 2016–2017) when its football team meets that standard; (2) a
set amount (for 2017–2018 it is $2.16 million) for each conference whose teams play in
the semifinal or national championship game to cover expenses for those games;
(3) Notre Dame will receive $2.65 million if it meets the APR standard, and the other
three independents will share $928,503; and (4) “certain conferences in the Football
Championship Subdivision (FCS) conferences will receive $2.53 million in aggregate.”
Revenue Distribution, supra note 133; Academic Progress Rate Explained: What Is the
APR and How Is It Calculated?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/aboutresources/research/
academic-progress-rate-explained [https://perma.cc/D7ZL-JKVH ] (defining “Academic
Progress Rate” as a system that “holds institutions accountable for the academic
progress of their student-athletes through a team-based metric that accounts for the
eligibility and retention of each student-athlete for each academic term”); Revenue
Distribution, supra note 133 (2016–2017 figure found on linked PDF).
135 See College Bowl Payouts Surpass $500 Million, ESPN (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/12688517/college-bowl-game-payouts-
surpass-500-million-first-year-college-football-playoff [https://perma.cc/82EM-JFE3].
136 See, e.g., DANIEL L. FULKS, REVENUES AND EXPENSES: NCAA DIVISION I
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 2004–2013 (2014), https://www.ncaa.
org/sites/default/files/2015%20Division%20I%20RE%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/56M
A-AHMA ] (showing revenue for Division I schools); Gould IV et al., supra note 4, at 16–
26; Steve Berkowitz, Pac-12 Zooms Past Big Ten, SEC in College Sports Revenue, USA
TODAY (May 23, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/05/23/pac-12-
conference-tax-return-revenue-record/9497233/ [https://perma.cc/N6S2-PCH4] (recounting
the increase in revenue from the Pac-12 conference); Randy Chua, How Much Revenue
Do College Sports Produce?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 15, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://
www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/1111/how-much-revenue-do-college-sports-produc
e.aspx [https://perma.cc/U9TP-7N5P] (looking at revenues from both college football and
basketball);NCAA Finances: 2015–16 Finances, USATODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/
ncaa/finances/ [https://perma.cc/6VST-GVTN] (ranking the NCAA schools by revenue);
Jon Solomon, Inside College Sports: SEC, Big Ten Dominate $100M Revenue Club,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/ins
ide-college-sports-sec-big-ten-dominate-100m-revenue-club/ [https://perma.cc/2GWN-
GPX3] (recounting the revenue from 2014-2015 from the SEC and Big Ten); STATISTA,
Revenue of College Football Teams in 2014 (in Million U.S. Dollars), http://
www.statista.com/statistics/249745/us-college-football-teams-revenue/ [https://perma.cc/9
ZFV-Y9HH] (showing statistics of revenue from college football programs).
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football in that same year.137 Both are Power Five conferences.138
The Power Five conference school revenues are “five times
greater than the revenues of these mid-major institutions,”
which stem primarily from the extraordinary differences in ticket
sales, rights, and licensing.139 The annual ticket revenue for the
athletic department at the University of Texas, for instance,
brings in almost one hundred times the revenue of the athletic
department at Troy University.140
Thus, a conference that generates more revenue can
afford to pay its players more than a conference that generates
less revenue. As a result, in football, the SEC would likely have
a higher base compensation and higher bonuses than
Conference USA, a non-Power Five conference. Opponents of
differentiated pay scales might argue that this would lead to
high school athletes wanting to play in the SEC or Big 10 instead
of Conference USA. This, however, is already the case. Elite high
school athletes want to, and typically do, play at high-profile
schools in the Power Five conferences141 to give themselves the
most exposure, which will give them the best opportunity to
make it to the professional ranks. Additionally, some
conferences may place greater value on academics, choosing to
adopt only the academic bonuses and not the base compensation
or athletics bonuses. Compensation accomplished on a
conference-level allows each conference to promote and reward
the performance that its institutions value most.
Also, each conference has a Student Athlete Advisory
Committee (SAAC) where college athletes collaborate
137 See Peter Berkes, The SEC Makes More Money Than Every Other
Conference, and It’s Not Close, SB NATION (Apr. 26, 2016, 8:39 AM), http://
www.sbnation.com/college-football/2016/4/26/11456612/athletic-department-finances-
sec-big-ten-pac-12-acc [https://perma.cc/PQ8K-DVQC] (“The SEC makes a per-team
average of about $14 million more in revenue than its closest peer and $12 million more
in average profit after expenses.”).
138 See Division I Committees, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance/
committees?division=d1 [https://perma.cc/K997-HNPF] (denoting the Power Five to
include “Atlantic Coast, Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12, and Southeastern [C]onferences”).
139 Gould IV et al., supra note 4, at 20–21.
140 Id. at 21.
141 See Matt Brown, What We Learned on Signing Day, SPORTS ON EARTH
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/163622032/college-football-signing-
day-what-we-learned [https://perma.cc/B9PM-Z2NS] (breaking down the Power Five
schools by ranked recruits signed and finding that the nation’s top recruits will play for
Power Five schools). High school recruits are rated on a scale of two to five by recruiting
services, with five serving as the top rating, and almost all five-star recruits attend
Power Five conferences. See Jeff Nusser, Rivals, Scout, ESPN, 247: Star Rating Systems
Explained, SB NATION: COUGCENTER (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.cougcenter.com/wsu-
football-recruiting/2013/2/5/3956800/rivals-scout-espn-247-star-rating-system-national-
signing-day [http://perma.cc/5DYD-DS9A] (explaining the star rating system associated
with high school recruits).
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interactively with athletic directors, coaches, and players from
other schools, to discuss and make rules and policies affecting
college athletes’ lives.142 Similarly, autonomy legislation allows
college athletes to work alongside athletic directors, coaches, and
players from amongst the Power Five conferences tomake policies
affecting college athletes’ lives.143 Mechanisms, therefore, already
exist to enable these conversations and changes to take place on
a conference-wide scale.
Rationale Behind the Duke Model’s Starting Base
Compensation
The Duke Model includes a base compensation to protect
every player, which is akin to what the National Football League
and National Basketball Association utilize through minimum
salaries.144 Thus, if a player falls out of favor with a coaching
staff for defensible or indefensible reasons, then that player still
maintains some level of security that he will receive some
compensation.
The Duke Model sets the highest base compensation for
football players in a Power Five conference who start every game
at $40,000. This number is based on the NCAA’s argument that
amateurism requires college athletes to forgo payment above
their scholarships, and if college athletes receive payment above
their scholarships, then supposedly fewer consumers would
watch college athletics.145 Indeed, as discussed previously, the
NCAA commissioned a study in the O’Bannon case measuring
consumer attitudes regarding college athlete payment.146 Even
though the study was flawed, the NCAA might argue it tended
to show that the more a college athlete would be paid, the more
142 See NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees (SAACs), NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/ncaa-student-athlete-advisory-committees-saacs
[https://perma.cc/R5R2-64QD] (listing the functions of the committees).
143 See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance
Scholarships, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2015), 6:58 AM) http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
media-center/autonomy-schools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships [https://perma.cc/
E8LL-UJQP] (where student athletes “push for involvement” in aspects of policies
affecting them).
144 Compare Michael Ginnitti, NFL Minimum Salaries for 2015 and the Veteran
Cap Benefit Rule, SPOTRAC (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.spotrac.com/blog/nfl-minimum-
salaries-for-2015-and-the-veteran-cap-benefit-rule [https://perma.cc/E56X-JGUE] (showing
that NFL rookies received a $435,000 minimum salary for the 2015 season), with What’s the
Minimum NBA Salary?, HOOPSHYPE (Oct. 12, 2015), http://hoopshype.com/2015/10/12/
whats-the-minimum-nba-salary [https://perma.cc/XF8L-WFNA] (finding a minimum
salary for an NBA rookie was set at $525,093 for the 2015–2016 season).
145 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078 n.22 (stating
that college athletes play for “the love of the game” and if they were to be paid it would
“jeopardize” the public’s view of college sports and result in less viewership).
146 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
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disapproving the consumer would be of payment.147 Although
this contention is highly questionable and lacking reliable
evidentiary support, the Duke Model placates the NCAA’s
consumer demand argument by choosing a relatively low
number for the highest base salaries that falls between the two
lowest numbers used in the survey.
Moreover, the Duke Model sets the base compensation at
a number that is considered (according to some methods) at the
top of the lower class income range and below middle class
income.148 According to the Pew Research Center, which defines
middle class as “two-thirds to two times the national median
income for your household size,” the range for middle class
income is between $46,960 and $140,900.149 A reasonable
consumer would likely understand that a college athlete serves
as the direct producer of a product that generates billions of
dollars, and that consumer would likely not stop watching
college sports simply because that college athlete earns a base
compensation in the lower class range.
For that same reason, consumers would likely not oppose
college athletes earning more than minimum wage for their
efforts given the billions of dollars the athletes generate. Using
the hours detailed in the Northwestern case, paying football
players minimum wage (the federal minimum wage is $7.25150)
multiplied by the hours they spend devoted to football
(approximately 1,750 hours) equals approximately $12,687.50.151
Under the Duke Model, even a scholarship athlete who was not
on the first or second team in football would make a base
compensation ($10,000 for the third team or $5,000 for being on
the team as a scholarship athlete) lower than minimum wage,
despite playing on a team that produced millions of dollars of
revenue. As a result, the highest base compensation of $40,000
represents a number that reasonable consumers would likely not
oppose, while also adequately compensating college athletes who
bring in millions in revenue to universities.
147 See June 30th Transcript of Record, supra note 81, at 2652–53.
148 Tami Luhby & Tiffany Baker, What is Middle Class, Anyway?, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/infographic/economy/what-is-middle-class-anyway [https://perma.cc/
3JA2-KVXH].
149 Id.
150 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2012); see also Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage [https://perma.cc/JNE4-HVTH]
(detailing the minimum wage requirements).
151 See Chris Isidore, Playing College Sports: A Long, Tough Job, CNN: MONEY
(Mar. 31, 2014, 6:58 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/news/companies/college-
athletes-jobs/index.html [https://perma.cc/B89D-CVRK] (determining that football
players at Northwestern spent 1,750 hours doing football-related activities according to
the NLRB decision).
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Forms of Compensation
Under the Duke Model, football and men’s basketball
players would receive a lump-sum payment after the season,
calculated based on different criteria. The following Sections use
a Power Five conference example to illustrate how the Duke
Model works. Non-Power Five conferences might agree on a
percentage of the Power Five conference proposal, and that
concept will be discussed below. Universities and college athlete
representatives could arrive at different numbers, or the same
numbers as the Duke Model, but the structure provides a
functional and flexible method to compensate college athletes.
1. Compensating Football Players According to
Their Depth Chart Status for Each Game to
Determine the Base Compensation
In football, the Duke Model calculates the base
compensation for a player in any conference depending on how
many games he started on offense or defense.152 In football,
teams typically use depth charts to determine who is the starter,
the second team player, and the third team player.153 The
starters, in the author’s experience, start the game and typically
play more than the second team players (who may not play at
all), who typically play more than the third-team players (who
also may not play during any given game).
The base compensation for an individual in a Power Five
conference school that started all twelve regular season games
on offense or defense would be $40,000 for the season. An
individual that served as a second-team player in all twelve
regular season games would earn a base compensation of
$20,000. A third-team player would receive $10,000. And a
scholarship player that does not fall within one of those three
teams would receive $5,000. If a player did not start every game,
but started some, then the compensation would be prorated
based on how many games the player served on the respective
152 Eleven players participate on every play for each team. Beginner’s Guide to
Football, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/rulebook/beginnersguidetofootball [https://perma.cc/
695Q-4JT7].
153 See 2017 College Football Depth Charts and Rosters, OURLADS, http://
www.ourlads.com/ncaa-football-depth-charts/ [https://perma.cc/GN6K-XT29] (listing depth
charts for all college football programs). A depth chart is a common tool used to map out
the placement of starting players, second-team players, third-team players, and the
remainder of players. See e.g., 2016–2017 LSU Tigers Depth Chart, OURLADS, http://
www.ourlads.com/ncaa-football-depth-charts/depth-chart/lsu/90981 [https://perma.cc/GE9
C-N9ZA] (last updated Dec. 31, 2016, 10:18 AM).
2017] THE DUKE MODEL 187
teams. Thus, if player X started all twelve games, he would earn
$40,000 for the season. If player Y played on the second team the
entire season, he would earn $20,000, and so on.
The base salary divided by twelve equals the amount a
player makes for each game. For example, if John Smith started
half of the games, but was demoted halfway through the season
to second team, then his compensation would be prorated as a
starter and second-team player based on how many games he
served in those roles. If Smith started half of the twelve games
and served as a second-team player the other half, then his
compensation for that year would be his starter compensation
earned plus his second team compensation earned. This same
approach would be applied to any scenario that might arise for
any player, such as a player serving as a third-team player for
three games, earning a second-team spot and playing in that
capacity for three games, and then taking over for the last six
regular season games as a starter because the starter at his
position suffers injury. The below Figures illustrate how the
Duke Model applies to these scenarios.
Fig. 1: Power Five Conference School Football Player
Pro-Rated Base Compensation
Depth Chart
Ranking
Compensation Per Game
Equation
(Assuming a 12 Game
Schedule)
Compensation Per Game
First Team $40,000÷12 $3,333.33
Second Team $20,000÷12 $1,666.67
Third Team $10,000÷12 $833.33
On Roster $5,000÷12 $416.67
Fig. 2: Power Five Conference School Football Player
Base Compensation Scenario A
Player John
Smith
Number of
Games
Compensation
Per Game
Equation
Compensation
Earned
First Team 6 ($40,000 ÷ 12) x 6 $20,000
Second Team 6 ($20,000 ÷ 12) x 6 $10,000
Third Team 0
On Roster 0
Total
Compensation
$30,000
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Fig. 3: Power Five Conference School Football Player
Base Compensation Scenario B
Player John
Smith
Number of
Games
Compensation
Per Game
Equation
Compensation
Earned
First Team 6 ($40,000 ÷ 12) x 6 $20,000
Second Team 3 ($20,000 ÷ 12) x 3 $5,000
Third Team 3 ($10,000 ÷ 12) x 3 $2,500
On Roster 0
Total
Compensation
$27,500
If a team went to the postseason for either a conference
playoff championship game, a bowl game, or the college football
playoffs, then the base compensation would be calculated using
a thirteen, fourteen or fifteen game schedule (for the national
finalists), meaning the base compensation for each player would
be divided by thirteen, fourteen or fifteen to determine how
much each game would be worth. The compensation for reaching
and winning a conference championship, bowl, or college football
playoff game would be disseminated as an athletic bonus,
discussed below.154
The special teams players155 would also be eligible for a
bonus based on athletic performance (discussed infra), but the
base compensation for special teams players includes the
following: the starting placekicker would receive $20,000; and
the kick-off specialist, punter, snapper, kick returner, and punt
returner would receive $10,000 each. The placekicker can
sometimes play a crucial role in determining the outcome of the
game through field goals and extra points, while the punter,
kick-off specialist, snapper, kick returner, and punt returner
each play a key role in dictating field position throughout the
game.156 The placekicker, given his potentially critical role,
would receive more than these other special teams players. The
placekicker does not, however, play as much as the offensive and
defensive players and, therefore, would not warrant the same
amount of base compensation as those players.
154 See infra Section III.C.3.
155 Special teams refer to plays in a football game where the ball is being kicked,
which include a kickoff, field goal, and punt. Beginner’s Guide to Football, supra note 152.
156 Lisa Horne, Just How Special are Special Teams in College Football?,
BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 26, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1580902-just-how-
special-are-special-teams-in-college-football [https://perma.cc/LZ4E-JG2S] (statistically
showing that “special teams . . . can and will impact the final score of [a] game”).
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The total compensation amount for starters would equal
$1,635,000.157 After adding in the special teams players’ $70,000
base compensation, the total base compensation amount would
equal $1,705,000.
A non-Power Five conference school, whose revenues fall
well short of a Power Five conference’s revenue,158 could still use
the same basic structure, but use a certain percentage of the
Power Five conference amounts. For example, a non-Power Five
conference might agree to pay half of the amounts that the
Power Five conferences would pay its members. The base
compensation in this scenario, including the special teams’
players and using half of the proposed DukeModel values, would
equal $852,500.
This system of performance-based compensation aligns
with the interests of the players who want to start and play as
much as possible. This system also aligns with the teams’
interests, which include encouraging competition amongst the
players, rewarding those players who earn starting spots on the
roster, and those who make advancements on the depth chart.
Criticsmay argue that college athleteswould oppose the idea
of their teammates receiving more compensation than them, which
could negatively affect team comradery.159 This argument lacks
merit and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of how
athletes think. Jay Bilas, a former Duke University basketball
player and assistant coach, who is also a lawyer and basketball
analyst with ESPN, agrees, stating that “[i]t’s patently absurd that
therewould be fights in the locker room if the best playermademore
money than the last player on the team or when the quarterback
makes more than the person who snaps him the football, just as
there aren’t fights in the locker room among coaches when the head
coach makes more money than the assistants.”160
Athletes see sports as a meritocracy.161 The better players
157 Football teams typically have eighty-five scholarship athletes. DIVISION 1
MANUAL, supra note 4, at§ 15.5.6.1. Whereas men’s basketball teams can have thirteen
scholarship athletes. Id. at § 15.5.5.1. Only scholarship athletes would be automatically
a part of the Duke Model. This total sum is calculated by multiplying the base salary by
the number of players at each level of compensation. It is each base compensation level—
$10,000, $20,000, and $40,000—multiplied by twenty-two offensive and defensive
players each for the first, second, and third teams, and $5,000 multiplied by nineteen for
players not on any of those teams but who are on the roster.
158 Gould IV et al., supra note 4, at 21–22 (discussing how Power Five conferences’
revenues are “five times greater than the revenues of . . . mid-major institutions”).
159 Schwarz, supra note 38, at 48–50 (debunking the myth that team comradery
will, in fact, not be compromised with teammates receiving different compensation).
160 Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, supra note 26.
161 Gerald Early et al., Baseball, Boxing and the Charisma of Sport and Race,
in THE CHARISMA OF SPORT AND RACE, 8 DOREEN B. TOWNSEND CENTER OCCASIONAL
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play more, the best players receive the awards, and, typically, the
better team wins. As a former Division I athlete, the author of this
article can attest that athletes will not resent a teammate who
makesmoremoney than themparticularly because, under theDuke
Model, compensation is based entirely on performance. Athletes
understand and accept that performance drives rewards already.
2. The Base Compensation for Basketball Players is
Determined by How Many Minutes Per Game
Each Player Participates
In men’s basketball, the base compensation under the
Duke Model would depend on how many minutes each player
averaged throughout the course of the season. Five players are
in the game for each team, and, like football, coaches can
substitute in other players throughout the game. Men’s college
basketball games currently consist of two twenty-minute halves
for a total of forty minutes. In a Power Five conference, a player
would receive a base compensation equating to the average of
minutes played per game over the course of the season,
assuming the player played in a sizeable number of games. For
example, if a player averaged thirty-five minutes per game in a
season, then the player’s base compensation would be $35,000.
Using the University of Kentucky (a Power Five
conference team) men’s basketball team as an example, the
average number of minutes players played ranged from 1.3 to
32.1.162 During the 2016–2017 season, under the Duke Model,
the player with the most minutes averaged per game, Malik
Monk, would have earned $32,100, the next highest average per
game would have earned $30,400, and so forth.163 The total base
compensation for the University of Kentucky team in 2016-2017
would have totaled only $215,800. Notably, all three of the
University of Kentucky’s men’s basketball team’s assistant
coaches received salaries higher than $215,800 for that season,
with the lowest annual salary of those three assistant coaches at
$400,000, and the highest assistant coach salary for that year at
$750,000.164 Moreover, non-Power Five conference schools could
PAPERS 5 (Christina M. Gillis ed., 1996) (“Sport is about meritocracy. People are
attracted to sport often because it is pure meritocracy.”).
162 Kentucky Wildcats Stats 2016–2017, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/mens-
college-basketball/team/stats/_/id/96/kentucky-wildcats [https://perma.cc/8GAP-R793].
163 Id.
164 Ben Roberts, UK Basketball Coaches Receive Raises, Contract Extensions,
LEXINGTONHERALD LEADER (July 13, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://www.kentucky.com/sports/
college/kentucky-sports/uk-basketball-men/article89387672.html [https://perma.cc/6EY
3-DCWJ].
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offer a lesser payment rate based on the school’s overall budget
since those conferences generate smaller revenues than the
Power Five conference schools.165
This approach again aligns with the interests of the players
and the teams as players want to play asmanyminutes as possible,
and coaches want their best players on the floor as much as
possible. Thus, minutes played in basketball represents the best
measure to determine a base compensation for these athletes.166
It must be noted that a player in football will be much
more likely to earn a full $40,000 base compensation than a
basketball player. Basketball players simply do not play all forty
minutes of every game over the course of a season. Also, the base
compensation totals for the teams are disparate between football
and basketball, with football team base compensation totals
much higher than basketball team base compensation totals.
The disparate treatment in both of those instances (i.e., higher
individual and team compensation in football than in basketball)
makes sense financially and equitably because football programs
tend to generate considerably more revenue than their basketball
programs, and football teams typically include eighty-five
scholarship athletes while basketball only includes thirteen
scholarship athletes.167
3. Bonuses—Athletic
The conferences and player representatives may agree that
base compensation is sufficient to compensate college athletes.
They may, however, also agree to pay bonuses based on athletic
performance. Employers, particularly professional sports teams,
often employ bonuses in their employees’ contracts to incentivize
the employees to perform at their maximum levels.168
Under the Duke Model, statistical leaders for the football
season on each team would receive a $5,000 bonus. Those
165 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
166 In college football, there are four quarters that are fifteen minutes each. The
number of plays on offense and defense will change each game depending on what
happens in the game (i.e., if one team controls the ball and runs a lot more plays than
the other team’s offense which cannot make a first down). Thus, the number of plays is
not a good measure for football, neither is minutes played as some plays take only a few
seconds and others take much longer.
167 See DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at §§ 15.5.6.1, 15.5.5.1 (restricting
football teams to eighty-five total scholarships and basketball teams to thirteen); see also
NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances [http://perma.cc/
JQJ4-U4F2] (reporting that in 2015–2016 the Texas A&M football program had the
highest revenue of any football or basketball program).
168 See Corry, supra note 118 (showing examples of professional football players
that earned bonuses by reaching performance thresholds).
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statistical categories include yards passing, yards rushing, yards
receiving, total touchdowns, total scoring, sacks, defensive
tackles, tackles for losses, interceptions, pass break-ups, special
teams tackles, kickoff return yardage, and punt return yardage.
Each university would pay a total of $65,000 for statistical
bonuses. In basketball, statistical leaders for the season on each
team would also earn $5,000, and those categories would include
points per game, rebounds, assists, blocked shots, and steals. The
total statistical bonuses per team would amount to $25,000. The
flexibility of the Duke Model also allows the conferences and
players to select for compensation only certain statistical bonuses,
such as passing yards, rushing yards, total touchdowns, sacks,
defensive tackles, pass break-ups, and interceptions.
Earning external honors aligns with the interests of the
players, who want recognition for their efforts, and the schools
because they benefit from the additional, positive exposure
based on the athletic feats of their athletes. The Duke Model
includes the following bonuses for external honors, meaning
honors bestowed by organizations or entities outside of the
university, as opposed to team awards given internally (such as
Rice University’s Most Valuable Player).169
The Duke Model would provide bonuses for Associated
Press All-American Honors170 and official All-Conference
Honors,171with differing levels based on the team onemade, such
as first team, second team, or third team. The bonus amounts
would range from $10,000 to $2,500 for All-American honors and
$5,000 to $1,000 for All-Conference honors. Winning the Heisman
Trophy, which is awarded annually to the most outstanding
football player in college football,172 would earn a player $25,000.
When Robert Griffin III won theHeisman Trophy while playing for
BaylorUniversity, “Baylor estimate[d] theHeismanwinwasworth
$250 million in extra donations, increased ticket sales, licensing
169 Chuck Pool, Ellerbee Names 2016 MVP, RICE OWLS (Feb. 19, 2017), http://
www.riceowls.com/sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/021917aac.html [https://perma.cc/M993-
DC76] (naming Emmanuel Ellerbee as the winner of Rice’s Most Valuable Player for the
2016 season).
170 AP Preseason All-American Team, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2017), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2017/08/22/ap-preseason-all-america-team/
104847964/ [https://perma.cc/X5GX-GUJD].
171 See e.g., 2016 All-Big 12 Football Awards Announced, BIG 12 SPORTS (Dec. 7,
2016), http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=211345089 [https://
perma.cc/CTN8-M6Z6] (announcing All-Conference titles and team for the Big 12); Pac-
12 Football Awards and All-Conference Team Announced, PAC-12 NEWS (Nov. 26, 2016),
http://pac-12.com/article/2016/11/29/pac-12-football-awards-and-all-conference-team-
announced [https://perma.cc/9F8L-J5KP] (listing the winners of All-Conference Honors).
172 Heisman Trust Mission Statement, Heisman, http://heisman.com/sports/
2014/9/15/GEN_0915145605.aspx [https://perma.cc/FSC9-WALK].
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fees, sponsorship deals, an expanded deal with Fox Sports
Southwest, and higher corn dog sales.”173
Athletes who earn these honors, whichmay traditionally be
thought of as amateur honors, significantly help generate millions
of dollars for their respective universities. Moreover, professional
athletes sometimes receive bonuses based on awards and accolades
they receive.174 The following Figure illustrates the external honors
bonuses for both football and basketball.175
Fig. 4: Individual External Honors Bonuses
Honor Bonus
Heisman Trophy Winner $25,000
National Player of the Year $15,000
Conference Player of the Year $10,000
Conference Offensive Player of the Year $7,500
Conference Defensive Player of the Year $7,500
Conference Freshman/Newcomer of the Year $2,500
All-American First Team $10,000
All-American Second Team $7,500
All-American Third Team $6,000
All-Conference First Team $5,000
All-Conference Second Team $2,500
All-Conference Third Team/Honorable Mention $1,000
Just as coaches receive bonuses for postseason success,
reaching a conference championship game, bowl game, or the
playoffs would warrant an additional bonus payable to each
member of the football or basketball team to reinforce the notion
that success on the team level takes an entire roster.176 For
example, Gary Pinkel, the former head football coach of the
University of Missouri, earned combined bonuses of $900,000 for
the 2014 season based, in part, on reaching the SEC title game
and playing in the Citrus Bowl.
173 Howard Bloom, How Much is Winning Heisman Worth?, SPORTS BUS. NEWS
(DEC. 7, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://sportsbusinessnews.com/content/how-much-winning-
heisman-worth [https://perma.cc/5PK9-LC6Q].
174 See Corry, supra note 118; Kurt Badenhausen, The World’s Highest-Paid
Athletes 2015: Behind the Numbers, FORBES (June 10, 2015, 8:55 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2015/06/10/the-worlds-highest-paid-athletes-
2015-behind-the-numbers/#4743fbe034ce [https://perma.cc/7B7X-ZDV2].
175 Berkowitz & Schnnaars, supra note 15.
176 Michael Aiello, Compensating the Student-Athlete, 23 SPORTS LAWS J. 157,
167–68 (2016) (stating that post season bonuses given to coaches “should be diverted to
student-athletes” because “spectators attend sporting events to watch the players play,
not to watch the coaches coach”).
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Fig. 5: Football Bonuses Per Player Based on
Team Success
Postseason Game Bonus per Player
Conference Championship Game Participant $1,000
Conference Championship Game Winner $2,000
Bowl Game Participant $2,500
Bowl Game Winner $5,000
National Semifinalist $7,500
National Runner-Up $10,000
National Champion $20,000
Fig. 6: Men’s Basketball Bonuses Per Player
Based on Team Success
Postseason Game Bonus per Player
Conference Championship Game Participant $1,000
Conference Championship Game Winner $2,000
NCAA Tournament 1st Round Participant $2,500
NCAA Tournament 2nd Round Participant $5,000
NCAA Tournament Sweet 16 Participant $7,500
NCAA Tournament Elite 8 Participant $10,000
NCAA Tournament National Semifinalist $20,000
NCAA Tournament National Runner-Up $25,000
NCAA Tournament National Champion $30,000
NIT Participant $2,000
NIT Champion $4,000
With the base compensation and athletic bonuses
described, an examination of two cases might serve useful. The
hypothetical involves players who play for the same Power Five
conference school to determine if the results appear equitable.
In Case Study 1, the star running back starts every game,
leads the team in rushing yards and total touchdowns. He earns
Conference Offensive Player of the Year, First Team
All-Conference and First Team All-American honors. His team
reaches the National Semifinal game in the college football
playoffs after winning its conference championship game. His
total pay would be $40,000 in base compensation, $10,000 in
bonuses for being a statistical leader in two categories, $22,500
in individual athletics honors bonuses, and $9,500 in team
athletics honors bonuses. This equals $82,000 and represents a
modest amount given the likely publicity he has garnered for his
team and university, the innumerable highlights of him on
SportsCenter, and the use of his image by the university and
networks to promote the games.
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In Case Study 2, the second-team cornerback plays
solidly, but his face is never used on any commercials, billboards,
or media items like press releases or game day materials. He
does not earn any All-American or All-Conference honors or lead
the team in any statistical categories. After winning its
conference championship game, his team reaches the National
Semifinal game in the college football playoffs. Despite being a
productive member of a team that generates considerable
revenue, his total pay would be just his $20,000 base
compensation plus $9,500 in team athletics honors bonuses for
a total of $29,500.
Given these outcomes—a star player earning a total of
$82,000 and a back-up player earning $29,500—it is unlikely,
and at best uncertain at this point before they are actually paid,
that a reasonable consumer would be outraged by these
numbers.177 An average consumer may understand that a player
who helps generate millions of dollars and considerable positive
exposure for his school, while starring in games and appearing
on television commercials that promote the games and
highlights, could earn $82,000. While $82,000 may be more than
that average consumer makes himself, that average consumer
likely does not directly generate millions of dollars of revenue in
whatever field the consumer works. A reasonable consumer
might also accept a back-up player earning a lower-class salary
despite serving as a solid contributor to a team that generates
millions of dollars of revenue. Consumer demand for college
athletics would likely not suffer.178 As set forth in the
Introduction, some coaches make millions of dollars. Fans
overlook large salaries if their team is winning.
The total for a team that included one first team
All-American, six all-conference players on the first team, six
177 See, e.g., McCormick & McCormick, supra note 4, at 497–98 (arguing for the
compensation of college athletes above their scholarship amounts); Joe Nocera, Let’s
Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Dec. 30, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html [https://
perma.cc/S64X-L9T3] (supporting the payment of college athletes); Will Hobson & Emily
Guskin, Poll: Majority of Black Americans Favor Paying College Athletes; 6 in 10 Whites
Disagree, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
colleges/poll-majority-of-black-americans-favor-paying-college-athletes-6-in-10-whites-
disagree/2017/09/14/27fa5fc2-98df-11e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.d8
82759ca56d [https://perma.cc/N9GF-LLUL] (“The idea of allowing players to earn money
if their image or likeness is used through the sale of merchandise has more broad-based
support than revenue-based pay, with 66 percent of Americans in favor.”).
178 Today the consumer demand for college football is extremely high. ESPN
even broadcasts a number of spring practice games. FBS (I-A) Schedule–2017, ESPN,
http://www.espn.com/college-football/schedule [https://perma.cc/NC76-QR9E]. In the
spring of 2016, Ohio State broke its own record for attendance at a spring practice game
with 100,189 fans attending the game. Ward, supra note 32.
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all-conference players on the second team, and a national
semifinal finish, including all of the statistical athletic bonuses
and base compensation, would be $2,462,500.179 This type of year
would be phenomenal and would reap millions of dollars in
revenue for the university, some of which should be allocated to
pay the players for achieving those successes for the school.
4. Compensating Athletes Under the Duke Model
Could Easily Be Accomplished by Reallocating
Resources or Allowing Alumni and Booster
Donations
This article next briefly discusses potential sources to
reallocate money to compensate college athletes. There are various
sources of funding, such as revenue from the college football playoff
system, coaches’ salaries, and facility expenses, which could be
reallocated to cover the expense of compensating players.180
For example, the revenues for the Power Five conferences
related to the 2016-2017 season for the college football playoff
system included the following: ACC, $88.5 million; Big 10,
$132.5 million; Big 12, $95 million; Pac-12, $101 million; and
SEC, $101 million.181 The number of teams vary by conference,
with the ACC including the most at fifteen and the (now
improperly named) Big-12 including the least at ten. Thus, if
every single team enjoyed an outstanding year (e.g., requiring
them to compensate players a total of $2,462,500), which is highly
unlikely and therefore grossly overestimates the following total,
it would take almost $37 million (fifteen teams multiplied by
$2,462,500 for each team) to compensate all of the football teams
in the ACC under the Duke Model. The revenues from the college
football playoff system alone, (e.g., $88.5 million for the ACC),
would easily compensate athletes and still leave over $50 million
for distribution according to each conference’s rules. After
compensating its athletes under the DukeModel, the Big 10, with
its fourteen teams, would have over $95 million remaining.
179 The figures break down to: All-American ($10,000), six all-conference players
on the first team (6 x $5,000 equals $30,000), six all-conference players on the second team
(6 x $2,500 equals $15,000), and a national semifinal finish (85 players x $7,500 equals
$637,500), including all of the statistical athletic bonuses ($65,000) and base compensation
($1,705,000).
180 The University of Texas, for example, is projected to spend $10 million to
renovate the team’s locker room and weight room. Brian Davis, It’s a Bargain: Texas’
126 New Football Lockers Will Cost $8,700 Each, Not $10,500, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN:
HOOK’EM PLUS (May 4, 2017), http://www.hookem.com/story/bargain-texas-126-new-
football-lockers-will-cost-8700-not-10500/ [https://perma.cc/JZC2-26YC].
181 Dosh, supra note 133.
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Even when looking at the traditionally less successful
football teams in the Power Five conferences or non-Power Five
schools, coaches’ salaries could be reallocated to compensate
college athletes. For instance, University of Kentucky’s head
football coach, Mark Stoops, received $3.5 million as salary in
2016, and his football staff received an additional $3.4 million,
for a total salary for football coaches—a group that does not
include the athletic director or athletic department staff—at the
University of Kentucky of over $6.9 million.182 Schools in
non-Power Five conferences, such as those in Conference USA,
could also reallocate money to compensate college athletes, even
if their compensation model included only a fraction of what
Power Five conferences would pay. Frank Wilson, the head
coach of Conference USA’s University of Texas at San Antonio,
received a salary of $835,000 in 2016, with an additional
$1,055,000 of salary going to his staff, totaling $1,890,000.183
Rice University, another Conference USA university, invested
over $30 million in building a sports facility.184 Universities and
athletics departments can reallocate money in many instances
from money spent on facilities or coaches’ salaries to player
compensation.185 Recall that the total base compensation for a
non-Power Five conference school that decided to compensate its
players at half the rate under the Duke Model would only
amount to $852,500. The Group of Five conference schools could
also use money received from the college football playoff system
to compensate its players.186
As for basketball, if a team that paid its base salary and
bonuses for statistical leaders, a conference championship win,
advancement to the national semifinal game of the NCAA
basketball tournament, saw its player win National Player of
the Year, Conference Player of the Year ($10,000), make First
Team All-American ($10,000), and have two players earn First
182 2016 NCAAF Coaches Salaries, supra note 6. Further, reallocation would be
simple as coaching salaries only represent “a fraction of the expenses” that university
athletic departments spend. Aiello, supra note 176, at 165.
183 2016NCAAFAssistant Coaches Salaries, supra note 11; 2016NCAAFCoaches
Salaries, supra note 6; 2016 NCAAF Strength Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY, http://
sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/football/strength [http://perma.cc/P7GE-CWNM].
184 Rice Holds Ceremonial Groundbreaking for New Brian Patterson Sports
Performance Center, RICEOWLS (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.riceowls.com/genrel/031015
aab.html [https://perma.cc/TG4C-4X6F].
185 Money from NCAA executive salaries could also be reallocated to compensate
college athletes. The President of the NCAA reportedly made $1,900,000 in 2014, and a
number of other NCAA executives made over $500,000 each. See Berkowitz, supra note
18. Reallocation of coaching salaries only represent “a fraction of the expenses” that
university athletic departments spend. Aiello, supra note 176, at 165.
186 See Revenue Distribution, supra note 133.
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Team All-Conference Honors, then the total compensation owed
players would be $571,800.187 By all standards, this would be a
wildly successful year for a basketball program. John Calipari,
the head coach of the Kentucky men’s basketball team, received
a total salary of over $7.4 million in 2017.188 A reallocation of the
head coach’s salary by itself could have easily covered all of the
players’ compensation for the entire season. College coaches
realize that their players generate billions of dollars in revenue
and those coaches might support the payment of their players.189
Money received from the NCAA basketball tournament—
which the NCAA doles out to conferences based on, among other
things, how many games the conferences’ teams win in the
tournament—could also be used to compensate players. In 2016,
the ACC reportedly received almost $40 million.190 If fifteen
teams in the conference performed exceptionally well, which
again is highly unlikely and thus grossly overestimates the
following total, only $8,577,000 would be needed to compensate
the players under the Duke Model. The ACC would have over
$31 million remaining to distribute to its teams.191
Furthermore, boosters and alumni could contribute
donations to compensate college athletes. For example, just as
boosters paid off Nick Saban’s $3.1 millionmansion to entice him
to remain as the head coach of the University of Alabama
football team, they might be willing to help fund players’
salaries.192 Thus, even if no reallocation of assets occurred,
booster and alumni contributions alone could likely cover the
costs to compensate college athletes.
187 The figures, based on Kentucky University’s basketball team, breakdown to:
base salary ($215,800), statistical leaders ($25,000), conference championship win
($2,000 x 13 players = $26,000), advancement to the national semifinal game of the NCAA
tournament ($20,000 x 13 players = $260,000), National Player of the Year ($15,000),
Conference Player of the Year ($10,000), First Team All-American ($10,000), and two
players earning First Team All-Conference Honors ($5,000 x 2 players = $10,000).
188 2017 NCAAB Tournament Coaches’ Pay, supra note 9.
189 SeeEdwardAschoff,Steve SpurrierWants Players Paid, ESPN (June 1, 2012, 2:08
PM), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/7990235/south-carolina-gamecocks-coach-
steve-spurrier-wants-pay-football-players [https://perma.cc/PSG6-KCB7] (stating that former
University of South Carolina head football coach Steve Spurrier wanted to compensate the
players with a stipend). This is akin to the full cost of attendance stipend later approved by the
NCAA. SeeO’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
190 Rovell, supra note 129; see also Daniels, supra note 130 (listing the bonus,
incentives, and other revenue the ACC has received over the last three NCAA
tournaments totaling over $100 million dollars).
191 Rovell, supra note 129; see also Daniels, supra note 130.
192 Scarborough, supra note 20.
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5. Bonuses—Academic
Conferences and player representatives may also agree
to bonuses based on academic performance. Bonuses based on
academic performance would further encourage college athletes
to perform well in the classroom, which is in accord with the
universities’ missions and the long-term success of college
athletes.193 The proposed bonuses that would be based on
academic performance linked to athletics include academic All-
Americans, All-District, and All-Conference teams.194
Schools could also award bonuses for academic awards
not linked to athletics, such as making the Dean’s List,
graduating, and graduating with honors.195 These academic
bonuses might provide athletes with additional incentive to
succeed in the classroom and graduate, though the average
consumer might scoff at these particular academic bonuses
because they do lack an immediate nexus to athletics and other
students do not receive monetary bonuses for achieving these
results, such as graduating or making the Dean’s List.
Nevertheless, the NCAA stresses the importance of “student” in its
self-serving phrase student-athlete;196 awarding academic bonuses
to athletes under the Duke Model simply reinforces that notion.
193 The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics formed “in October
1989 in response to highly-visible scandals in college sports . . . promotes reforms that
support and strengthen the educational mission of college sports.” Amy Perko, Knight
Commission Calls for NCAA to Transform its Guidelines for March Madness Revenues
to Better Support College Athletes and Protect Financial Integrity, KNIGHT COMMISSION ON
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (May 10, 2016), http://knightcommission.org/resources/press-
room/965-may-10-2016-knight-commission-calls-for-ncaa-to-transform-its-guidelines-for-ma
rch-madness-revenues-to-better-support-college-athletes-and-protect-financial-integrity [htt
ps://perma.cc/6NWC-P8YU]. The Commission makes recommendations to the NCAA, some
of which the NCAA has adopted. Id. The Commission consistently recommends that the
NCAA use its basketball fund to reward academic success and positive academic outcomes of
college athletes rather than just reward universities based on their success in the NCAA
tournament. Id.
194 Specifically: Academic All-American First Team ($10,000), Academic All-
American Second Team ($7,500), Academic All-American Third Team ($6,000), Academic
All-District Team ($5,000), and Academic All-Conference ($4,000).
195 Specifically, Dean’s List ($7,500), graduating ($5,000), graduating cum
laude ($6,000), graduating magna cum laude ($7,500), and graduating summa cum laude
($10,000).
196 Except in quotes by others, I purposefully refuse to refer to athletes in
college as “student-athletes” based on the history of the phrase “student-athlete.”
Professors Robert and Amy McCormick traced the roots of the NCAA’s phrase
“student-athlete” to a Colorado Supreme Court holding in 1953, noting that:
[I]n University of Denver v. Nemeth, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a
determination by the state Industrial Commission that Ernest Nemeth, a
football player at the University of Denver, was an “employee” within the
meaning of the Colorado workers’ compensation statute. Thus, the university
was obligated to provide workers’ compensation for his football injuries.
Stunned by the Nemeth decision, the NCAA responded by coining the term
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IV. ADDRESSING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO THEDUKE
MODEL
In addition to the arguments against the Duke Model
that are addressed above, this Part addresses three other major
arguments against the DukeModel: (1) this compensation model
further devalues education from the perspective of college
athletes; (2) the model should account for the value of education
that college athletes receive; and (3) Title IX prevents
compensating only male athletes in two sports; and (4) college
athletes are ill-equipped to manage a salary responsibly. Each
of these counterarguments are addressed below.
The Duke Model Further Devalues Education for College
Athletes
One might argue that the over-commercialization of
major college sports devalues the education portion of college
athletes.197 One might also argue that if colleges and universities
compensate college athletes for playing their respective sports,
then education will be valued even less by college athletes.198 As
an initial matter, this argument fails if conferences choose to
adopt the academic bonuses to compensate college athletes for
their academic achievements. Second, whether education is
valued or devalued for each college athlete depends on how each
institution approaches academics with its players, as well as how
each player values his education.
“student-athlete” and requiring its exclusive use thereafter. By emphasizing
the identity of athletes as “students,” the NCAA endeavored to diminish any
tendency to characterize them as “employees.” . . . “[The NCAA] crafted the
term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules
and interpretations as a mandated substitute for such words as players and
athletes. [The NCAA] told college publicists to speak of ‘college teams,’ not
football or basketball ‘clubs,’ a word common to the pros.” The NCAA adopted
and mandated the term “student-athlete” purposely to buttress the notion that
such individuals should be considered students rather than employees.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 38, at 83–84 (footnotes omitted) (quoting WALTER
BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE
ATHLETES 69 (1995)) (citing Tom Farrey, Pay-for-Play: Not Yet, But Soon?, ESPN (Mar.
28, 2003), http://espn.go.com/neb/ncaatoumeyOl/s/2001/0326/1162258.html).
197 SeeNick Desal, College Should be About Education First, HUFFINGTONPOST
(Aug. 11, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nick-desai/colleges-should-be-
about_b_5669998.html [https://perma.cc/9F8S-PDDA] (stating that not only would
paying athletes devalue the athlete’s education it would also create an “imbalance
between a student athlete and just a student” and devalue every student’s education).
198 See Rick Burton, College Athletes Are Already Plaid with Their Education, US
NEWS (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:21 AM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-ncaa-athletes-
be-paid/college-athletes-are-already-paid-with-their-education [http://perma.cc/S264-3RVQ]
(“higher education is often (and falsely) assumed to have no value for athletes”).
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As for the NCAA, it already appears to value money over
education as a large amount of the NCAA’s distributions are made
based on athletic success.199 Moreover, the NCAA allows the
scheduling of football and basketball games on weekdays,
including Monday through Thursday, which seems
counterproductive if the NCAA truly wants college athletes to
study during the week while staying fresh for class and practice.200
Reallocating the monies from college football and men’s
basketball201 will not change the fact that people are receiving
money from college athletics; it will simply redirect some of the
money to those producing the product of major college sports, the
athletes. Nevertheless, a reallocation of money does not dictate
that a player, individual school, or conference value or stress
academics less or more—athletes, schools, and conferences are
free to prioritize academics as they want.
The Duke Model Should Account for the Value of
Athletic Scholarships
Some may argue that the Duke Model should compute in
the value of the education that athletes receive because the
education they receive possesses value.202 This argument fails for
several reasons. One, while it is true that the scholarship
represents a value, the compensation that athletes receive
should not be capped arbitrarily at the value of the scholarship.
There is no cap on how much coaches can be paid,203 how much
schools can devote to improving facilities, NCAA executive pay,
or athletic director salaries, and there should not be a cap based
on the scholarship value for athletes.
199 See NCAA, 2017 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN (2017), https://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017NCAA_DivisionI_RevenueDistributionPlan_2017
0426.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PHP-4ECF].
200 See 2017 College Football Schedule, FB SCHEDULES (2017), http://
www.fbschedules.com/college-football-schedule/ [http://perma.cc/S264-3RVQ]; 2015-2016
Men’s College Basketball TV Schedule, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2015, 5:56 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2015/10/29/2015-16-mens-college-basketball-tv-
schedule/74829074/ [https://perma.cc/2KC7-KUVG].
201 College football and men’s basketball have evolved into a multibillion-dollar
business over the years through television contracts, increased ticket sales, and now the
college football playoff system. Andy Staples, The Future of College Sports Media Rights:
How Will Deals Evolve With the Landscape? Punt, Pass & Pork, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.si.com/college-football/2016/03/28/how-are-college-sports-
media-rights-deal-evolving (recounting the evolution of the college sports business).
202 See Ackerman & Scott, supra note 35; Chudacoff, supra note 35.
203 See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (1998)
(striking down the NCAA rule capping compensation for assistant, entry-level college
coaches’ salaries).
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Second, this argument ignores the fact that since the 1950s,
well before college athletics became a multibillion-dollar industry,
universities have provided scholarships to their athletes.204 Thus,
universities have been able to afford athletic scholarships for over
half a century, and they continue to do so. Now that college
athletics generates billions of dollars, though, the direct producers
of that product—the athletes—should receive some of the revenue
they generate. Finally, as discussed above, universities and
colleges have the ability to pay college athletes by reallocating the
money generated by college athletics that is currently given to
others (e.g., coaches and athletic directors).
Title IX Serves as an Impenetrable Barrier to
Compensating College Athletes in Football and Men’s
Basketball
Inevitably, when compensation for football and men’s
basketball is discussed, some will argue that Title IX forms the
ultimate barrier to such compensation. Antitrust economist
Andrew Schwarz argues that Title IX does not preclude
compensation for college athletes playing football or men’s
basketball.205 Schwarz asserts that Title IX “aims for gender
equity in participation and the regulations offer three ways to
comply, none of which speak directly to equal funding. One is
meeting the needs of all of the under-represented gender, the
second is a subjective concept of progress towards equity, and the
third and most common is actual equity in participation.”206 First,
female participation in sports need not change if football andmen’s
basketball players received payment above their scholarship
amounts. Second, Schwarz argues that even if an interpretation of
Title IX required equal spending on women’s sports and men’s
sports, then a system of payment “would function like a 100%
payroll tax on the male college athlete’s pay.”207 For example, “if a
star quarterback is worth $50,000 to a school . . . then the most
they could afford to offer him would be $25,000, knowing the other
$25,000 had to go to meet their (theoretical) Title IX pay-equity
burden.”208 Thus, an interpretation of Title IX that required dollar-
for-dollar equal spending would not prevent a payment system for
football and men’s basketball athletes, although the salaries
204 McCormick & McCormick, supra note 38, at 84 (stating that universities
formally sanctioned full grant-in-aid athletic scholarships in 1956).
205 Schwarz, supra note 38, at 59–62.
206 Id at 60.
207 Id at 62.
208 Id.
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received by these athletes would be lower than theirmarket values,
and such a system would actually further enhance spending on
women’s athletics.209
One more likely possibility exists, though, if Title IX is
read to require dollar-for-dollar spending on men and women’s
sports(which is arguable), where a university pays its football
players a total of $2,462,500 via reallocated revenues or booster
and alumni donations,210 and the exact same amount is contributed
to women’s sports via those same avenues. Matching the payment
of men’s college basketball players would be even easier as
payments would reach around $571,800 on the high end under
the Duke Model, when a team had an excellent season. In any
event, compensating football and men’s basketball players in
college would not require the demise of women’s sports or the
need to cut men’s sports, but it could lead to a significant
increase in spending on women’s college athletics, which would
tend to improve women’s athletics, not destroy them.
College Athletes are Ill-Equipped to Manage
Compensation Responsibly
The payment of college athletes also raises issues of
taxation and financial coverage for injuries suffered while playing
in college. College athlete salaries would likely be subject to
taxation as income. Lawyers or certified public accountants
provided by the university could assist athletes with filling out
their tax forms, just as Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
provides tax assistance to low-income individuals and families.211
Universities already provide extensive academic support for
athletes with tutors and study hall; assistance with filing taxes
would simply be another form of support.212
209 Id.
210 See supra Section III.C.iv4.
211 IRS VITA Grant Program, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/irs-vita-
grant-program [http://perma.cc/P9EF-UDXR] (last updated Oct. 5, 2016) (explaining
that VITA is an initiative designed to help “low- to moderate-income individuals . . . file
their taxes each year”).
212 See e.g., Academics for Student Athletes, OR. STATE U., http://
oregonstate.edu/studentathlete/ [https://perma.cc/5KDC-WP89] (offering, among other
services, a “Bridge Summer Program” designed to “help[] student athletes transition to
the academics . . . through learning skill development, academic course credit and
University orientation programs”); Academic Support Services, U. OF SOUTHERN CAL.,
http://saas.usc.edu/academic-support-services/ [https://perma.cc/6949-3C2P] (providing
academic counseling services, priority scheduling, study hall, tutorial services, computer
labs, travel laptops, excused absence letters, OASIS (Online Academic Student
Information System and disability testing for all of their college athletes to make sure
“they have a successful and delightful college career while engaging in their competitive
sports”); Longhorn PRIDE Program, TEX. SPORTS, http://texassports.com/sports/
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The NCAA already attempts to educate college athletes
on being financially aware.213 The NCAA and universities could
expand this effort to include providing financial literacy tools for
college athletes on responsibly managing a salary. Such efforts
would help college athletes act as good stewards of their
compensation by teaching them how to spend, invest, and save.
It is quite possible that many college athletes, who live below the
poverty line while in school,214 would simply be sending their
earned compensation back to their families to take care of rent,
food, and utilities. If taxation does occur, college athletes would
rather receive a salary reduced by taxes than no salary at all.
As far as providing financial coverage for injuries, which
would be akin to workers’ compensation, athletes in major
college sports should be entitled to compensation for injuries
sustained as a result of playing in college.215 Although there is
currently a program in place that helps pay for some injuries
suffered by college athletes,216 this program leaves cracks in the
system that sometimes result in the players and their families
paying medical bills;217 extending financial coverage to college
athletes could seal those leaks.
Earning compensation for playing would not change the
universities’ expectations that college athletes maintain
2013/8/28/academics_0828134433.aspx [https://perma.cc/7V89-NA6N] (discussing a
college athlete academic program, called “[t]he Longhorn PRIDE Program (Personal
Responsibility in Developing Excellence) . . . a comprehensive life skills program
committed to the welfare of student-athletes” and one that “has been recognized as one
of the best life skills program in the nation”).
213 Schwarz, supra note 38, at 71–72; Financial Awareness Best Practices for
Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/leadership-development/
financial-awareness-best-practices-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/E9ZB-MWG9].
214 SeeMcCormick & McCormick, supra note 4, at 507 (discussing many college
athletes live below the poverty line).
215 See Shaun Loughlin, Workers’ Compensation and Student-Athletes:
Protecting the Unpaid Talent in Profit-Making Enterprise of Collegiate Athletes, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1737, 1749–51 (2016); John Stahl, Worker’s Compensation Coverage for
Student-Athletes?, LEXISNEXIS (Sept. 23, 2011, 6:49 PM), https://www.lexisnexis.com/
legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/b/workers-compensation-law-blog/archive/
2011/09/23/workers-compensation-coverage-for-student-athletes.aspx [https://perma.cc/
U687-DXCL].
216 The program is the NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance Program, which
provides coverage to “student-athlete[s] who [are] catastrophically injured while
participating in covered intercollegiate athletic activity,” but it fails to cover athletes who
are not totally disabled unless the costs of their injuries meet the policy deductible.
Student-Athlete Insurance Programs: Catastrophic Insurance Program, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/insurance/student-athlete-insurance-programs [https://
perma.cc/PZL2-8LMR].
217 See Loughlin, supra note 215, at 1742; Jon Solomon, College Athletes’ Rights:
NCAA Requires Health Insurance, But Schools Decide What to Pay, Alabama Media
Group (Feb. 19, 2012, 7:55 AM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/02/college_
athletes_rights_ncaa_r.html [https://perma.cc/9SNN-5UK6].
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academic eligibility to receive compensation.218 Athletes would
still need to conduct themselves in a manner that comports with
the athletic program and university’s standards.219 College
athletes, on the other hand, might seek “independent verification
of [their] grades” to avoid being removed from the team for
non-academic or athletic performance issues.220
Before any part of the Duke Model could be implemented,
the prohibition on compensating college athletes would need
to be extinguished, and the stakeholders would need to agree
on a compensation model. The current infrastructure of the
NCAA provides a general framework that would allow the
stakeholders—the athletes, athletic and school administrators,
and NCAA representatives—to accomplish those goals. The next
Part discusses the current infrastructure of the NCAA, how it
lends itself to changing the rule on compensation and adopting
the Duke Model, and obstacles to those changes.
V. HOW THEDUKEMODEL COULD BE IMPLEMENTED AND
OBSTACLES THERETO
The NCAA Division I Governance Structure and SAACs
Provide the General Framework for Initiating a
Conversation About, and Implementing, the Duke Model
The NCAA, which is an unincorporated non-profit
organization, regulates and oversees college athletics on a
national level.221 It includes more than 1,200 member
institutions spanning three divisions: Division I, Division II, and
Division III.222 Division I offers full scholarships to college
athletes, and this division represents “the highest level of
218 Academic eligibility under the NCAA requires athletes in their second year
to have a minimum grade-point average “that equals at least 90 percent of the
institution’s overall cumulative grade-point average required for graduation.” An athlete
in their fourth or later year must have a “minimum grade-point average . . . that equals
100 percent of the institution’s overall cumulative minimum grade-point average
required for graduation.” DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 14.4.3.3.
219 Telephone Interview with Jay Bilas, supra note 26.
220 Id.
221 NCAA, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES
7 (2017), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015-16NCAA_FinancialStatement_
20170223.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TGB-JME9].
222 Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification,
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership [https://perma.cc/M4AH-
44BK]. Division II uses a partial scholarship model, and it competes at an intermediate
level. Division II Partial Scholarship Model, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/division-
ii-partial-scholarship-model [https://perma.cc/N4SD-CXLK]; see also MATTHEW MITTEN
ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 99 (3d ed. 2013). Division III does not offer
scholarships and represents the lowest level of competition for these divisions. Id.
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competition in most sports.”223 Division I schools generate the
most attention because they “generally have the biggest student
bodies, manage the largest athletics budgets and offer the most
generous number of scholarships.”224
The NCAA would need to abolish its rule prohibiting
college athletes from earning compensation above their
scholarships for playing their respective sport, and then it could
adopt the Duke Model pay-for-play compensation system.225 The
current governing structure of the NCAA includes not only NCAA
representatives and university officials (such as athletic directors,
university presidents, faculty athletics representatives), but also
college athletes, who participate in a minority role. The NCAA, in
fact, recently reformed its governing structure in Division I to
include college athletes in the process of decision and policy-
making. Even though their numbers are limited, college athletes
could initiate conversations that lead to the rule changes
necessary to enable the conferences to adopt the Duke Model.
The NCAA’s “governance structure consists of legislative
bodies—made up of volunteers from [its] member schools—that
govern each division, as well as a group of committees that set
association-wide policy. These committees manage topics affecting
sports rules, championships, health and safety, matters impacting
women in athletics, and opportunities for minorities.”226
The Division I structure has changed in the past few
years. “Division I recently redesigned its governing system to
create a structure that is more nimble and streamlined and to
be more responsive to membership needs. Members adopt
bylaws governing Division I through two legislative
processes[,] . . . Autonomy and Council Governance.”227 The new
structure allows for collaborative efforts and, among other
things, more college athlete participation.
Both processes[—Council Governance and Autonomy—which are
discussed below], include[] input from presidents, chancellors,
directors of athletics, athletics administrators, coaches, faculty
representatives, conference personnel and [critical for purposes of
223 MATTHEWMITTEN ET AL., supra note 222, at 99.
224 NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 [https://
perma.cc/76KY-MDXW].
225 See generally Amateurism: Prize Money Based On Place Finish, NCAA,
https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposalView?id=597 [https://perma.cc/J5BK-QBNK]
(providing that a college athlete becomes ineligible if one “[u]ses his or her athletics skill
[directly or indirectly] for pay in any form in that sport”).
226 Governance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance?%2520Division=d1
[https://perma.cc/DK5V-QJWW].
227 Division I Governance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance?division=d1
[https://perma.cc/S9AM-3H5D].
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the Duke Model,] student-athletes . . . . NCAA committees [are]
populated by membership personnel [that] conduct the division’s
day-to-day business and establish strategic direction for the future.
The membership receives assistance in this regard from staff at the
NCAA national office.228
For example, the Division I Board of Directors includes liaisons
from the NCAA’s office, such as Kevin Lennon, the NCAA’s Vice
President for Division I governance.229
“Division I’s committee structure oversees everything
from championships administration and sport oversight to
strategic planning and the overall health of Division I.”230
According to the NCAA, “[t]he student-athlete voice is an
important component of the Division I governance structure.”231
The 2014 restructuring gave “more emphasis to student-athlete
voice at every level of decision-making.”232
The Council Governance includes the Division I Council,
which is “responsible for day-to-day operations of the division”
and constitutes the division’s primary policy-making body.233
The Division I Council is comprised of forty members who are
“athletics administrators (e.g., athletics directors, senior
woman administrators, conference administrators, compliance
administrators and other senior level administrators), faculty
athletics representatives and student-athletes.”234 “Two members
of the Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee participate
and vote in meetings of the Division I Council . . . .”235 The
Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (SAAC) also has a voting
college athlete on each of the eight standing committees of the
Council.236 The Division I Council committees create legislation on
228 Id.; see also Division I Board of Directors, NCAA, http://web1.ncaa.org/
committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=BOARD [https://perma.cc/TT6J-
MADU]; Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Staffing Changes at National Office, NCAA (Mar. 25,
2015 9:24 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/staffing-changes-
national-office [https://perma.cc/F6JH-2P36]. These processes are Council Governance and
Autonomy. See discussion infra notes 258–77 and accompanying text.
229 Division I Board of Directors, supra note 228; Hosick, supra note 228.
230 Division I Governance, supra note 227.
231 Id.
232 Division I Committees, supra note 138. Potential new NCAA rules and
changes to existing policies “develop within the committee governance structure
throughout the year, while other legislative measures are submitted by member
conferences.” Division I Governance, supra note 227.
233 Division I Committees, supra note 138. The NCAA governance structure is
composed of a legislative body called the Council that volunteer from member schools
that govern Division 1, as well as a group of committees that determine association-wide
policy. Id.
234 DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 4.3.1.
235 Division I Governance, supra note 227.
236 Division I Council Substructure, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/DI%20Council%20Substructure.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TCB-Z4JN]. The following
eight Standing Committees report to the Council: The Student-Athlete Experience
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a variety of topics relating to the well-being of college athletes.237
The other major governing process in Division I, Autonomy, also
includes college athletes in the decision-making processes.238
In 2014, the new governance model also “grant[ed]
flexibility to schools in the Atlantic Coast, Big 12, Big Ten,
Pac-12 and Southeastern conferences to change [or pass] rules
for themselves in a list of specific areas within Division I.”239 The
areas of autonomy for the Power Five conferences include,
among others, financial aid and “awards, benefits and expenses
for enrolled student-athletes and their families and friends.”240
This structure is referred to as autonomy, and college athletes
participate actively in the autonomy governance structure.
“Conferences choose [fifteen] student-athletes to be part of the
[eighty] votes cast on autonomy legislation.”241 Non-Power Five
conference schools may, but are not required to, follow any of the
autonomy legislation passed by the Power Five conferences.242
The Division I Council reports to the Division I Board of
Directors, which consists of “[t]wenty chief executive officers
(CEOs), one director of athletics, one senior woman
administrator, one faculty athletics representative and one
student-athlete. All FBS conferences have a permanent seat.
Five FCS and five Division I Subdivision conferences rotate
Committee, The Strategic Vision and Planning Committee, The Legislative Committee,
The Competition Oversight Committee, TheMen’s Basketball Oversight Committee, The
Football Oversight Committee, The Women’s Basketball Oversight Committee, and The
Division I Student Athlete Advisory Committee. Id.
237 Division I Council Substructure, supra note 236 (noting Council committees
provide suggestions over athlete awards, financial aid, benefits, and health and safety);
see DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 4.3.2 (“The Council shall . . . [r]ecommend
nonacademic policies to the Board of Directors. . . .”).
238 Division I Governance, supra note 227.
239 Division I Committees, supra note 138; see DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note
4, at § 5.02.1.1.
240 DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 5.3.2.1.2. Some of the other areas of
autonomy include time demands, meals and nutrition, recruiting restrictions, health and
wellness, insurance, career transition, and academic support. Id.
241 Division I Governance, supra note 227. The other votes are institutional
votes consisting of the members of the Power Five conferences. NCAA, DIVISION I
STEERING COMMITTEE ONGOVERNANCE, RECOMMENDEDGOVERNANCEMODEL 32 (2014)
[hereinafter DIVISION I STEERING COMMITTEE], https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
DI%20Steering%20Commitee%20on%20Gov%20Proposed%20Model%2007%2018%201
4%204.pdf [https://perma.cc/33XM-W3LZ] (reporting that out of the eighty votes, sixty-
five will be institutional and fifteen college athletes).
242 DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 5.3.2.1.2.2. See Hosick, supra note
143 (discussing the rule adopted through autonomy that allows schools to provide
scholarships that cover the full cost of attendance); Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes
to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2014), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/
11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-power-conferences [https://perma.cc/
3PHU-UXNP] (stating “the full cost-of-attendance stipends . . . could be worth between
$2,000 and $5,000 per player”).
2017] THE DUKE MODEL 209
seats.”243 Finally, the Board of Governors, a NCAA-association
wide committee, represents “the highest governing body” of the
NCAA.244 “The Board of Governors consist[s] of [twenty]
members,” including “[t]he NCAA president and the chairs of the
Division I Council and the Division II and Division III
Management Councils,” and chancellors or presidents from
Division I, II and III schools who serve on other NCAA
committees.245 The Division I Council and Autonomy enable
college athletes to push for reform of the NCAA rules to allow
college athletes to earn compensation for playing their respective
sport in college under the Duke Model.246 These other governing
bodies, such as the Division I Board of Directors and the Board
of Governors, could also seek these rule changes as well.247
One obstacle to the reform of NCAA rules through these
governance structures involves the minority participation of
college athletes, as there are only one or two of them on some of
these major governing bodies. This means that the majority of the
participants, comprised of NCAA representatives and university
officials, would need to push for these changes, too. A second
obstacle stems from the college athletes who do serve on these
councils, boards, and committees. Not all of them are football or
men’s basketball players. For example, Brady Bramlett, from the
University of Mississippi, serves as the sole college athlete
representative on the Division I Board of Directors.248 He plays
243 Division I Board of Directors, supra note 228.
244 NCAABoard ofGovernors, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/
ncaa-board-governors [https://perma.cc/P466-SGG5]; see also Board of Governors, NCAA,
http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=EXEC [https://per
ma.cc/9AER-V6JR].
245 NCAA Board of Governors, supra note 244. The NCAA president and chairs
of the Division I, II and III councils are the “ex officio nonvoting members, except that
the NCAA president is permitted to vote in the case of a tie among the voting members
present and voting.” Id. The other members include, specifically, “eight chancellors or
presidents from the Division I Board of Directors from Football Bowl Subdivision
institutions; . . . [t]wo chancellors or presidents from the Division I Board of Directors
from Football Championship Subdivision institutions; . . . two chancellors or presidents
from the Division I Board of Directors from Division I subdivision institutions; . . . two
Division II chancellors or presidents from the Division II Presidents Council; and . . . two
Division III chancellors or presidents from the Division III Presidents Council.” Id.
246 DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at §§ 5.2, 5.3 (describing the legislative
process that allows for changes to fundamental aspects of previously established rules
and regulations).
247 Id. (stating that any action that is “contrary to the basic purposes,
fundamental policies and general principles set forth in the Association’s constitution
may be overridden by the Association’s entire membership by a two-thirds majority vote
of those institutions voting.”); see also Division I Board of Directors Endorses Sweeping
Changes to Enforcement Model, NCAA (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/news/division-i-board-directors-endorses-sweeping-
changes-enforcement [https://perma.cc/FB2C-UVMD] (commenting on the Board of
Director’s ability to make a binding vote).
248 Division I Board of Directors, supra note 228.
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baseball.249 Despite the merits of the argument based on the
billions of dollars generated by college football and men’s
basketball, one might wonder how vigorously he would argue for
compensation for fellow college athletes who do not play his own
sport. Adding representatives to these legislative bodies from
football and men’s basketball, particularly from Power Five
conference schools, might help further the reform suggested in this
article as the laborers who do create the product on the field would
likely argue more strenuously because they would be the direct
beneficiaries of such rule changes.
The removal of the prohibition against compensating
college athletes could be discussed and advocated by the Division
I council and autonomy participants. But ultimately a two-thirds
majority vote of all members of the NCAA would be needed to
change this rule as it affects a dominant provision of the NCAA,
namely amateurism.250And athletes would not have a vote in such
a situation.251 Therefore, opponents of the Duke Model might also
question why the NCAA and its members would approve the rule
change allowing college athletes to earn compensation via the
adoption of such a model when the NCAA and its members have
so vehemently opposed paying college athletes in the past. There
are several responses to that question that relate to why the
NCAA and its members benefit from the Duke Model. First, the
NCAA and its member institutions avoid the negative press and
249 21–Brady Bramlett, OLE MISS BASEBALL, http://www.olemisssports.com/
sports/m-basebl/mtt/brady_bramlett_825152.html [http://perma.cc/6Y9N-VM3Y].
250 See DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 5.02.1.2 (requiring “a two-thirds
majority vote of all delegates present and voting in joint session at an annual or special
Convention” for “a regulation that applies to all members of the Association”); id. at
5.3.9.4 (stating that “[t]he action of any specific division challenged by the Board of
Governors as being contrary to the basic purposes, fundamental policies and general
principles . . . may be overridden by the Association’s entire membership by a two-thirds
majority vote of those institutions voting); id. at § 2.9 (setting forth the NCAA’s general
principle of amateurism that requires all “student-athletes” to be “amateurs in an
intercollegiate sport”). Ironically, Rule 2.9, which discusses amateurism, provides that
“student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises”, which is precisely what the NCAA and its members are doing to college
athletes. See generally Acain, supra note 113; Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian
McCormick A Trail of Tears: The Exploitation of the College Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 639 (2010) (discussing the “various forms of exploitation of college athletes” and
how managers of college athletes, including the NCAA, benefit from such athletes while
athletes are devoid of legal protections).
251 See DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 4, at § 5.1.3.1.1 (stating “[e]ach active
member and each member conference with voting privileges . . . shall be entitled to one
vote”); id. at § 5.1.3.4 (stating a voting “delegate shall not represent any active member
or member conference unless the delegate actually is identified with such member, and
an institution’s student may not serve as its voting or alternate voting delegate”).
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the costs of continuing antitrust litigation brought on behalf of
college athletes against the NCAA and conferences.252
Second, if college athletes prevailed in any of those
antitrust cases, then the amount ofmoney that could change hands
in a free market might be much more than in a controlled Duke
Model. This approach also forestalls any efforts by the NLRB to
rule officially that college athletes are employees, and it would
likely prevent Division I FBS scholarship athletes at private
colleges and universities from bringing a labor complaint.
If the NCAA and its members decided to implement the
Duke Model, this would not be the first time they made such
drastic changes to enhance the benefits of college athletes in the
face of external threats such as litigation or government
pressure.253 For instance, the Board of Directors adopted the
autonomy legislation a day before the O’Bannon ruling.254
Notably, the autonomy legislation passed after some Power Five
conference commissioners and others from the Power Five
conferences threatened to “split[] off into a separate division if
autonomy failed.”255 Thus, the Duke Model would also help the
NCAA avoid any type of secession by the Power Five conferences
from the NCAA system.
If the rules are changed to allow for compensation through
the Duke Model, each conference could use a structure similar to
SAACs where the NCAA would have a representative, each school
in the conference would have a representative, and the players for
each sport (football and basketball) would have their own
representative, preferably a lawyer or agent who would negotiate
on behalf of the players, as well as players. SAACs could easily
morph into a structure that includes the foregoing stakeholders.
Currently, a SAAC consists of college athletes, among
others, who “provide insight on the student-athlete experience”
and the “rules, regulations and policies that affect
student-athletes’ lives.”256 The NCAA requires all member
institutions and conferences to have SAACs.257 A conference
252 See, e.g., Jenkins v. NCAA Complaint, supra note 76, at 1–3, 40 (involving
football and men’s basketball players seeking a free and open market system of payment
for college athletes beyond their scholarship amounts).
253 Bennett, supra note 242.
254 Id. (noting that on Thursday, August 7, 2014, the Division I board voted “to
allow the schools in the top five conferences to write many of their own rules”); see also
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (signing the judgment on August 8, 2014).
255 Bennett, supra note 242.
256 NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees (SAACs), supra note 142.
257 Id. (defining National and Campus SAACs, along with student
representative number requirements for Division I, II, and III); NCAA, DIVISION 1 SAAC
MISSION STATEMENT, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/SAAC%20Web%20Informa
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KUG-QGCS] (listing some of SAAC’s duties as reviewing
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SAAC “serve[s] as a medium of communication through which
student-athletes, conference administrators, institutional
representatives, NCAA representatives and coaches discuss
and take action on issues relating to rules and regulations;
student-athlete welfare; and community service.”258 Conference
SAACs have the power to do the following: vote on new rules or
changes to existing rules; recommend potential legislation in
their respective conference; and “recommend potential NCAA
legislation.”259 They also “[r]eview, react, and comment to the
governance structure on legislation, activities, and subjects of
interest.”260 Some recent subjects of interest have been the time
demands of Division I college athletes, the NCAA Division I
shared governance, and financial literacy (i.e., talking to
athletes about financial issues, including ways to best “manage
funds provided through cost of attendance”).261
Each conference typically allows for each academic
institution to send two representatives to the conference SAAC,
which includes male and female athletes.262 Additionally, each
conference SAAC includes a chair and vice chair, who are elected
by their peers.263 The SAAC from each Division I Conference
selects one representative to represent the college athletes’
interests, from their conference, on the NCAA SAAC.264
“[s]tudy issues [and] mak[ing] policy [and] legislative recommendations regarding
amateurism, recruiting, financial aid, awards [and] benefits”).
258 Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (SAAC), ACC, http://www.theacc.com/
page/SAAC [https://perma.cc/XMG2-LC5W].
259 NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees (SAACs), supra note 142.
260 Birmingham-Southern Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, BIRMINGHAM-
S. C., http://www.bscsports.net/information/saac [https://perma.cc/VUJ9-8RRV].
261 NCAA, REPORT OF THE NCAA DIVISION I STUDENT-ATHLETE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE: OCTOBER 3–4, 2015 MEETING (2015).
262 See, e.g., Big 12 Conference Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, BIG 12
SPORTS, http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=1523127 [https://per
ma.cc/PW4J-6K84] (listing the members of the Big 12 SAAC and their representative
schools); Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (SAAC), supra note 258(providing a short
history of the ACC’s SAAC); Chris Taylor, Taylor Serves as ACC SAAC Representative,
GODUKE (July 18, 2015), http://www.goduke.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=210224587
[https://perma.cc/79VB-6TGN] (describing his experience as the SAAC representative for
Duke University).
263 See SAAC Members Meet at Conference Office, Big 12 Sports (July 26, 2017),
http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=211
657600 [https://perma.cc/ZT4W-6Q3E] (stating the Big 12 Conference SAAC selects the
chair and vice chair during their meetings); see also Big 12 Conference Student-Athlete
Advisory Committee, BIG 12 SPORTS, http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?A
TCLID=1523127 [https://perma.cc/53PD-Q237] SAAC Members Meet at Conference
Office, Big 12 Sports (July 26, 2017), http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbm
l?DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=211657600 [https://perma.cc/ZT4W-6Q3E] (stating the
Big 12 Conference SAAC selects the chair and vice chair during their meetings).
264 Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (SAAC), supra note 258 (“There will be
one student-athlete from the SAAC who will represent the ACC on the NCAA SAAC.”).
SAACs also elect members onto the Division I Board of Directors, Council, and various
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SAACs have demonstrated they can be effective. For
example, the Division I Council adopted a measure to enhance
the information provided to college athletes participating in
Division I sports, including expected time commitments.265 The
Division I SAAC, comprised of thirty-two athletes from various
sports and each from different conferences266 (currently there are
only two football players and two men’s basketball players on
the Division I SAAC),267 first introduced the need for this
information and pushed to pass the legislation.268 SAACs also
successfully advocated for the adoption of legislation that
lessens the time demands on Division I athletes.269
SAACs provide a general framework that could facilitate
the implementation of the Duke Model in each conference.
Representatives of the athletes would need to be added to
represent the football and men’s basketball interests fully.
committees (competition oversight committee, football oversight committee, men and
women’s basketball oversight committee, etc.). See, e.g., DIVISION I STEERING
COMMITTEE, supra note 241, at 18, 21, 24 (2014). In addition, they vote members onto
their own committees to fill void spots. See BIG 12 CONFERENCE, STUDENT-ATHLETE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE (June 4, 2012) (Meeting minutes), http://www.big12sports.com/
pdf8/848268.pdf?DB_OEM_ID=10410 [https://perma.cc/DH9T-UWD7].
265 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Council Approves Time Commitment
Legislation, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2017, 16:21 EST) http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/
article/2017-01-18/di-council-approves-time-commitment-legislation [https://perma.cc/
VGT4-ZNMD] (“In addition to drug testing and graduation rates information, recruits
would receive information about the time commitments involved in participating in
Division I sports.”).
266 See, e.g., Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, NCAA, http://
web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=1SAAC [https://
perma.cc/L6EC-JEBN] (listing Division I SAAC members, the sport they play, and the
institution they attend).
267 See id.; see also Division II Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, NCAA,
http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=2SAAC
[https://perma.cc/2QKR-C67J] (listing twenty-eight Division II SAAC members who
compete in sports including, soccer, tennis, volleyball, skiing, baseball, basketball, track
and field, cross country, mixed rifle, golf, and softball); Division III Student-Athlete
Advisory Committee, NCAA, http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?
CommitteeName=3SAAC [https://perma.cc/36MF-GFBD] (listing twenty-two members
competing in sports including, volleyball, basketball, soccer, football, softball, lacrosse,
tennis, and baseball).
268 Hosick, supra note 265 (noting that Division I “SAAC members advocated
for the proposal and helped create informational material schools can use to fulfill the
new requirement”).
269 Jake New, Trying Again on Time Demands, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 18,
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/18/time-demands-concussion-polic
ies-be-focus-ncaa-meeting-week [http://perma.cc/56NM-8CM8] (discussing a push to
lessen time demands); accordHosick, supra note 265 (“Student-athletes in Division I will
be able to more easily pursue internships and study abroad opportunities after the
Division I Council on Wednesday adopted new legislation providing additional flexibility
in eligibility rules.”); see alsoAmyWimmer Schwarb, SAACReveals Time Demands Survey
Results at Division I Issues Forum, NCAA (Jan. 15, 2016, 11:54 PM) http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/news/saac-reveals-time-demands-survey-results-division-i-
issues-forum [https://perma.cc/5Y29-7PY7] (reporting on the SAACs survey depicting
student sentiment to decrease the amount of time they spend playing sports).
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These conference-wide structures could determine which aspects
of the Duke Model to implement (i.e., base salary, athletic
bonuses, academic bonuses or a combination of all three) at the
particular amounts to ensure that all universities have the
ability to pay and the athletes receive compensation for their
efforts in generating massive revenues for their schools and
conferences. Representatives from each school in a conference,
as well as an NCAA representative, could work together with
the players and their representatives to implement the aspects
of the Duke Model they want. Therefore, the Duke Model could
be implemented using slight variations of the existing
infrastructure of the NCAA and SAACs.
CONCLUSION
College athletes should reap what they sow. They create
a product in a multibillion dollar business that relies on their
skill, dedication, and performance to thrive. The Duke Model
provides a system for compensating college athletes in a fair and
reasonable manner. The existing infrastructures in the NCAA
provide the general framework to implement a compensation
model, and that compensation model should be the Duke Model.
